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Physical Attestation of Cyber Processes in the Smart Grid

  • Conference paper
Critical Information Infrastructures Security (CRITIS 2013)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 8328))

Abstract

Cyber-physical system security must consider events in both the cyber and physical layers. This paper proves that a cyber process in the smart grid can lie about its physical behavior and remain undetected by its peers. To avoid this scenario, physical attestation is introduced as a distributed mechanism to validate the behavior of a cyber process using physical measurements. A physical attestation protocol is developed for the smart grid, and the protocol is proven to expose malicious cyber behavior. Through the use of physical attestation, the behavior of cyber processes in cyber-physical systems can be verified.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science Department, Missouri University of Science and Technology, Rolla, MO, 65409, USA

    Thomas Roth & Bruce McMillin

Authors
  1. Thomas Roth
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  2. Bruce McMillin
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. TNO Defence, Safety and Security, Oude Waalsdorperweg 63, 2597 AK, The Hague, The Netherlands

    Eric Luiijf

  2. Distributed and Embedded Security Group, University of Twente, P.O. Box 217, 7500 AE, Enschede, The Netherlands

    Pieter Hartel

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© 2013 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

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Roth, T., McMillin, B. (2013). Physical Attestation of Cyber Processes in the Smart Grid. In: Luiijf, E., Hartel, P. (eds) Critical Information Infrastructures Security. CRITIS 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8328. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-03964-0_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-03964-0_9

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-03963-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-03964-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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