Abstract
My aim in this (final) chapter is to consider how the replacement of induction and the principles of constancy and coherence by IBE affects the epistemic status of beliefs acquired ampliatively (non-deductively), and to discern ways in which it renders Materialism and the explanationist version of Hume’s Idealism differentially vulnerable to scepticism.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
The argument is easily rebutted if justification is taken to be fallible. We can concede that the conclusion of an inductive argument may be false even if its premises are true, and that in this, induction differs from, indeed falls short of, deduction. But that doesn’t mean, as the sceptic is (implicitly) assuming, that inductive grounds do not provide good reasons. The term ‘reason’, we will point out (Edwards, 1949), doesn’t mean ‘logically conclusive’, and inductive grounds, despite being logically inconclusive, may well provide good reasons, thereby rendering belief in their conclusions rational. Taking a risk, we will remind the sceptic (and ourselves), may be eminently reasonable. It is rational, for instance, to take a medicine one thinks very likely, although uncertain, to cure one of a horrible disease even if it infrequently has pretty unpleasant side-effects.
- 2.
When we are inferring from a sample to the entire population (induction by enumeration), nature’s uniformity will require samples (usually) to be typical of the entire population. Hume’s sceptical reasoning works equally well (or badly) for both versions of nature’s uniformity.
- 3.
I add yet another way of using the term ‘internalism’. It is hitherto used in (at least) four different ways. There is, first, the doctrine that requires for the justification of a belief (or inference-rule) a second-order justified belief about the factors that make first-order justification possible (van Cleve, 2003). This usage is closest to mine. The difference is that it doesn’t require the second-order belief to be justified independently of the first-order belief (as it must be in my variety of internalism). According to the second variety of internalism, commonly known as mentalism, epistemic status supervenes on facts about the subject’s mental states. According to the third, commonly known as accessibilism, the subject must be able to tell by reflection that his belief (inference-rule) is justified. According to the fourth version, the subject constitutes the conditions of justification: a belief (inference-rule) is justified just in case the subject thinks it is.
- 4.
Alston (1993, p. 80) argues, in a somewhat similar vein, that of all the alternative explanations of our experience – the real-world hypothesis and various sceptical hypotheses (demon, brains in a vat, etc.) – the real-world hypothesis is the only one that we have bothered to develop. So we cannot invoke its explanatory superiority to argue for its (probable) truth even if we think that explanatoriness is truth-conducive. Here, the threat is not from unconsidered rivals, but rather, from underdeveloped ones. And the worry is that a true theory that we have considered will be ranked lower than a false (but better developed) one.
- 5.
Lipton’s “rebuttal” is reminiscent of Stove’s (1973, p. 61) attempt to dispatch Hume’s sceptic by ascribing to him the claim that unless a proposition, h, or its negation, is logically implied by a proposition, e, then P(h/e) = P(h). Adding evidence, e, to one’s premises has no rational bearing on h, and ought to leave unchanged its probability. Stove notes that this principle is inconsistent with the probability calculus: if P(e) < 1, P(h) > 0, and h implies e, then P(h/e) = P(h&e)/P(e) = P(h)/P(e) > P(h). He concludes that Hume’s scepticism is incoherent. Alas, scepticism isn’t so easily refuted. What the sceptic claims is that we are not warranted in assigning probabilities to propositions. He thinks the probability calculus doesn’t even enter the (epistemological) picture!
- 6.
Suppose N(0) is assigned probability 0.9 (because it is the simplest explanation and explains well). Then P(~N(0)) = 0.1. Now, for v ≠ 0, N(v) entails ~N(0)). So P(N(v)) ≤ P(~N(0)). So (P(N(v)) ≤ 0.1. So P(~N(v)) ≥ 0.9. So P(N(v)) < P(~(N(v)).
- 7.
BLA concedes an assumption that even friends of IBE don’t accept: that explanatoriness is a perfect guide to truth. Of course, this strengthens the argument: even if we are allowed to make this overly optimistic assumption, we will still be forced to admit that IBE is unjustified.
- 8.
This argument is much more threatening than BLA. Even if we think that a basic rule of inference is prima facie justified absent a reason for thinking it is unreliable, surely it is no longer justified once such a reason is available!
- 9.
It might be argued in response that the superior explanation engendered by the added ontological commitment justifies it.
Bibliography
Cartwright, N. (1983). How the laws of physics lie. Clarendon Press.
Edwards, P. (1949). Russell’s doubts about induction. Mind, 68, 141–163.
Ladyman, J., Douven, I., Horsten, L., & van Fraassen, B. (1997). A defence of van Fraassen’s critique of abductive inference. Philosophical Quarterly, 47, 305–321.
Alston, W. (1993). The reliability of sense perception. Cornell University Press.
van Fraassen, B. C. (1980). The scientific image. Clarendon Press.
van Fraassen, B. C. (1989). Laws and symmetry. Oxford University Press.
Broad, C. D. (1925). The mind and its place in nature. Kegan Paul.
Lipton, P. (1993). Is the best good enough? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 93, 89–104.
Lipton, P. (2004). Inference to the best explanation (2nd ed.). Routledge.
Popper, K. R. (1972). Objective knowledge. Oxford University Press.
Stanford, P. K. (2006). Exceeding our grasp: Science, History and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. Oxford University Press.
Stove, D. C. (1973). ֺProbability and Hume’s inductive Scepticism. Clarendon Press.
van Cleve, J. (2003). Is knowledge easy – Or impossible? Externalism as the only alternative to skepticism. In S. Luper (Ed.), The skeptics. Ashgate.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2024 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Weintraub, R. (2024). Hume’s Criticism of Our Ampliative Practice Doubly Transformed (With Idealistic Help). In: Humean Bodies and their Consequences. Jerusalem Studies in Philosophy and History of Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-50799-1_15
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-50799-1_15
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-031-50798-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-031-50799-1
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)