Abstract
This chapter focuses on the problem of transcendence in “On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External World” (HCM, 1916) (Doctrine of Appearance)—the first publication from a vast corpus of writings by Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888–1966) (HCM). The principles of the realistic phenomenology that HCM explores in this treatise by studying the phenomenon of the real external world designate her early ontology upon which her later metaphysical worldview would be based. Her establishing argument associates transcendence with mundane reality while eliminating any mystical aspect from it. Although the ontological aspect of the problem of transcendence is more dominant in HCM’s approach, its epistemological dimensions are not denied but illuminated through her discussion of the nature of the human spirit in the face of which the world appears as external. My main argument is that HCM’s phenomenology of externality lays the foundations for the phenomenology of transcendence. Consequently, transcendence transpires as the depth and the most ultimate meaning not only of external phenomena but also of reality as such.
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Notes
- 1.
For the resistance of philosophical problems from solution, see: Dillon (1998, 75).
- 2.
HCM was one of the early phenomenologists of Munich Circle which, apart from her, included a group of intellectuals and philosophers from Munich, the first generation of the phenomenologists, whose prominent members included: Alexander Pfänder, Johannes Daubert, Moritz Geiger, Theodor Conrad, Adolf Reinach, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Maximilian Beck, Max Scheler, Jean Hering, Alexander Koyré, Roman Ingarden, and Edith Stein. For further reading about this circle see: Avé-Lallemant (1975).
- 3.
In Realontologie, HCM will distinguish between the idea of transcendence upon which her realistic approach is based and the mistaken one. The first means a “continuing maintaining” (fortdaurende Erhaltung) of the real thing in its real being that is established by-itself and in-itself. The second is characterized as fragile and suffering from possible dependence on immanence because of its rootedness in the human spirit, see: HCM (1923, 185–186).
- 4.
HCM explains that is a mistake (quite common in positivistic approaches) to identify “existences independence of consciousness” with the “real external world” (HCM, 1916, 391). In her opinion, what appears as dependent in its being cannot appear as what presents itself (HCM, 1916, 413 n. 2). Spiegelberg explains that the very independence of the subject should not be considered as the essence of reality but as a “fundamental and essential result of reality” (excluding real acts of the subject that of course depend on him or her). See: Spiegelberg (1975, 132 n. 2).
- 5.
The early phenomenologists understood Husserl’s appeal “go back to the ‘things themselves’” (Husserl, 1970, 168; 1984, 10) as indifference toward epistemological questions. See: U. Avé-Lallemant (1965/1966, 207). For the relations between phenomenology and epistemology and phenomenology, see: Spiegelberg (1975, 130–131). Like HCM, who characterized the epistemological approach as dogmatic (HCM, 1916, 347) and incapable of coping with its questions (Spiegelberg, 1975, 131), Spiegelberg too criticized epistemology, which in its highly speculative accounts of how knowledge works omits its first and paramount obligation to be critical itself (Spiegelberg, 1975, 152).
- 6.
HCM’s approach was directed toward the object, and later on she will explicitly reject the phenomenological reduction. See: HCM (1963, 17).
- 7.
- 8.
HCM was committed to “essence intuition” (Wesensfassung), which she shared with the early phenomenologists of Munich Circle. They were inspired by Husserl’s struggle in Logical Investigations against psychologism, relativism, and various reductionisms (Husserl, 1970, §23 51, §31 74/1975, §23 82, §31 117), in particular by his principle that it is possible to observe consciousness’ condition apart from the thinking subject (Husserl, 1970b, III, §5 10/1984, III, §5 240). For further reading about this circle see: Avé-Lallemant (1975, 19–38). HCM admits the influence of Logical Investigations on her, see: HCM (1916, 355). About the method of “essence intuition”, especially in the realistic school of phenomenology, see: Reinach (1913), Pfänder (1913, 325–404), Pfeiffer (2005, 1–13), Schmücker (1956, 1–33), Ebel (1965, 1–25), Avé-Lallemant (1959, 89–105), Walther (1955, 190).
- 9.
- 10.
See HCM’s criticism of skepticism: HCM (1916, 358, 398). HCM’s widespread use of the word “believe” (glauben) clearly indicates the adoption of the typical certainty that stood at the foundation of the Husserlian phenomenology. See in particular: HCM (1916, 355, 370, 398, 407, 413, 418, 423, 446, 496, 500, 513). Husserl regarded skepticism as a denial of apodicticity, i.e., necessary and universal truths that are essential for any theory to make sense. He distinguished between three forms of skepticism: “logical”, “noetic”, and “metaphysical”. See: Husserl (1970, §57–§61 134–141/1975, §57–§61 214–226). As for Husserl, so also for HCM in Doctrine of Appearance the metaphysical skepticism that denies the objective knowledge of the real world is the most problematic. For further discussion, see: Wachterhauser (1996, 1–62, 227–238). Regarding Husserl’s certitude, see: Kołakowski (1975).
- 11.
For further reading regarding intuitive cognition, see: Cobb-Stevens (1990), Hintikka (2003). HCM’s choice to anchor her study of the external world in “sensory- givenness” that deals with the characters of the sensory given, which she regarded as enabling “real touch” with the external world (HCM, 1916, 423), made it possible for her to keep the duality that is composed of the objective content of givenness external in its origin and the direct experience of the subject that feels it. Elsewhere, I have discussed in length the realism of sensory givenness, see Chapter 1 in this volume and: Miron (2014).
- 12.
In Realontologie, while discussing the issue of materiality, she refers again to the concept of “the manifest surface”. Her principal argument there is that the material being has depth and internality, but only its external can reach sensory appearing. While the illuminated part is outside, the dark and closed faces are inside or in depth. She establishes that there is a causal bond between these two elements of the material being. Therefore, especially because there is depth, there is also manifest surface, see: HCM (1923, 205–206). For additional references to the idea of manifest surface, see: HCM (1923, 206–209, 214, 235–236).
- 13.
Heinemann expressed very similar ideas to HCM’s in his article on concrete phenomenology. He mentions her article “Phänomenologie und Spekulation” (HCM, 1965b), see Heinemann (1960, 185 n. 2), but does not refer to her most relevant treatise to his discussion, Doctrine of Appearance, with which he was undoubtedly familiar.
- 14.
Helmut Kuhn is a contemporary of HCM’s who was part of the German phenomenological movement in the 1920s. He well described this as follows: “The things towards which the gaze is directed are always known in advance, we do not start at a null point. They show themselves to us, but they are concealed. They are standing up against us as known but also as mysterious, and impose on us the distinction between what things are in their beginning and the essence that is uncovered by penetrating observation” (Kuhn, 1969, 399). See in this context Husserl’s “The principle of all principles” that requires accepting “whatever presents itself in ‘intuition’ in primordial form […] only withing the limits in which it presents itself” (Husserl, 1952, §24 51/2012, §24 43).
- 15.
The aspect of darkness will appear in Realontologie as one of the expressions of reality, see: HCM (1923, 206).
- 16.
In Realontologie, HCM explores this aspect and determines that the real being must achieve a “‘position of your own’ (Eigenposition)” (HCM, 1923, 177–179).
- 17.
Like HCM, Spiegelberg also argues that genuine phenomena are not influenced by theoretical or other interpretations, while untrue ones collapse as soon as their falsification is uncovered. See: Spiegelberg (1975, 164). Spiegelberg’s ideas in this essay closely resemble those of HCM in Doctrine of Appearance. Obviously, he was familiar with this work, but surprisingly none of HCM’s writings are even mentioned in his essay. However, Spiegelberg provides the lacking but important background and explanation of HCM’s principles of realism.
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Miron, R. (2023). The Realism of Transcendence: A Critical Analysis of Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Early Ontology. In: Hedwig Conrad-Martius. Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences, vol 8. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25416-1_3
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