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Introduction

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Abstract

In Chap. 1, I introduce the theme of the book and delineate the content of the following chapters. One of the central themes of this book is the idea that transcendental logic and transcendental idealism go together, and that the logic of thought that is the ground of possible knowledge of objects entails epistemic humility about how the world is in itself. The humility is not a detachable add-on to the logic of possible knowledge, but follows directly from the conceivability thesis, namely the Strawsonian core idea that the self of experience and the object of experience are reciprocal elements of the same ‘limiting framework of all our thought about the world and experience of the world’, which dictates what we can conceivably know about objective reality. This shows what it means to be able to think about objects if we are able to think at all. Transcendental idealism is the framework from within which objects can be seen as in principle intelligible. It constitutes the bounds of transcendental logic.

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Notes

Notes

  1. 1.

    See Dyck (2014), Howell (2018), Land (2018), Stephenson (2014), and Watt (2017); see my reaction to Dyck and Stephenson in Schulting (2014, 2017, Chap. 2).

  2. 2.

    Quarfood (2014) is more positive than my other critics; see also Blomme (2018).

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Schulting, D. (2022). Introduction. In: The Bounds of Transcendental Logic. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71284-6_1

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