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Indirect Design and the Revelatory Potential of Biology

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The Compatibility of Evolution and Design

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Abstract

This chapter develops a model for the compatibility of design and evolution as explanations, examining how the evidence from biology continues to support belief in design. It argues that we can save both the rationality of an intuitive design discourse and the rationality of seeing biological teleology as evidence of design, even when adopting an evolutionist view of biology. Design and evolution function as conjunctive explanations, so that the success of evolutionary explanations does not remove the explanatory power added by design. Potential objections to the model are considered, building on the traditional philosophical objections. One of these is the problem of natural evil, which has been seen as refuting all design-based views. I argue, however, that the combination of evolution and design that this book has developed can respond to all these concerns as well as any other theological approach, and may even help in better responding to the problem.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Kim ’s argument is applied to the case of theistic evolution by Leidenhag (2019), who argues that many forms of theistic evolution in which God’s causal role is not clearly specified can indeed be criticized for causal overdetermination. However, Leidenhag differs from ID proponents in arguing that the Creator’s causal role does not need to be scientifically detectable. For an excellent discussion of these points, see Skogholt (2020) and Leidenhag (2020).

  2. 2.

    For a further, more robust, reconstruction of Mayr’s concepts, see Ariew (2003). I am indebted to Visala (2011, 125–139).

  3. 3.

    Here, the role ascribed to God may seem too limited for some. For them, I would add that a wider theological perspective on biological purpose could also answer other questions, such as “Why does evolution appear to have a direction”, and might provide further understanding of how divine causation relates to the particulars of evolution. For instance, one might have theological reasons for believing (or not believing) that divine control of evolution extends beyond that required for setting up the process.

  4. 4.

    It seems to me that this duality of possible design arguments may create a dilemma for those who would rely on evolution as a defeater of design arguments. The proponent of design could argue roughly as follows: if evolution is highly contingent and its outcome is highly improbable, then reaching this outcome would be better explained by theism. However, if evolution is not as improbable and not as contingent, then the patterns of evolution are explained to a large degree by the background conditions and laws, and evolution simply pushes the search for an explanation further.

  5. 5.

    To be fair, there is a way to extend Plantinga’s account in a manner close to the idea that the divine guidance of mutations could help supplement evolutionary explanations, mentioned at the end of this chapter. Plantinga could argue that we can accept evolutionary explanations as correct, but that taken by themselves evolutionary explanations are still improbable (or cannot predict the actual evolution of a species like humans), and hence this leaves space for supplementing evolutionary explanations with the additional idea of divinely guided mutations. Nevertheless, evolutionary explanations are not typically regarded as this improbable.

  6. 6.

    The possibilities of commonsense reasoning as the basis of design arguments is also defended by Axe (2017). However, unlike the strategy adopted here, Axe’s defense is anti-evolutionist.

  7. 7.

    Vodder (2018) pressed me for clarity on this point in response to Kojonen (2016b), in which I presented an earlier version of some arguments here.

  8. 8.

    The program discussed by Wahlberg is Tonica Fugata 9.0., released by Capella Software, but many other similar programs also exist. A free demo version can be downloaded from http://www.capella.de/Download_tonica.cfm.

  9. 9.

    Harrison (2017) is an excellent discussion of the metaphysics of mathematics and its relevance for theism.

  10. 10.

    Ayala ’s theodicy is critically analyzed by Doran (2009) and Berhow (2019).

  11. 11.

    In the philosophy of religion, such a “problem of good” has recently been used in the discussion of the “evil God” hypothesis (Page and Baker-Hytch 2020).

  12. 12.

    Quoted in Loikkanen (2015, 181).

  13. 13.

    This, at least, is Dembski’s position as he has clarified it in dialogue with his critics, such as Michael Ruse. Dembski (2004, 9) argues that “Ruse is wrong that the Explanatory Filter separates necessity, chance and design into mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories.” See also Dembski (2008, 221) for similar comments. As Corabi (2009) and Berhow (2019) also note, the ID perspective allows for a great deal of regularity in nature.

  14. 14.

    Baker-Hytch (2019) argues that harms may be connected in a way that if are able to suffer, then it is better for them to be mortal. Peels’ (2018) analysis of natural selection fits well with this kind of argument.

  15. 15.

    Wahlberg aims his critique particularly against the versions of the evolutionary theodicy presented by Haught (2000, 53), Polkinghorne (2011, 83), and Southgate (2008).

  16. 16.

    Quoted in Murray 2011, 144–145.

  17. 17.

    There have been attempts to argue that the human fall might have effects on the history of the cosmos already before the Fall. See, for example, Dembski (2008); for a critique see Sollereder (2018, 67–70) and Peels (2018, 552–554).

  18. 18.

    Murray (2011, 170–175) presents further problems for the idea that evolution is necessary for moral autonomy, or that creation out of nothing would threaten it.

  19. 19.

    Here my discussion, however, sidesteps the major theological views of compatibilism and theological determinism—some forms of which attempt to argue that divine determinism does not remove creaturely culpability. The link between responsibility and freedom was notably criticized by the Protestant reformers Luther (Visala , Vainio 2020), and Calvin (e.g., Bignon 2017). Many of the same theologians would also oppose the application of the concept of moral responsibility to God, and our ability to evaluate God’s actions in general (Davies 2006; Dougherty and McBrayer eds. 2014).

  20. 20.

    Adopting a full-blown process view of God, in which divine omnipotence and creation out of nothing are questioned, might arguably provide a different picture, but would also mean giving up central features of the traditional understanding of God, which would result in other serious problems. For example, as Pak (2014, 2016) argues in depth, in such a view it is difficult to guarantee that good will ultimately triumph over evil.

  21. 21.

    While it may be difficult to find a line of argument that gives God only the glory but not the blame, I think there is a stronger difficulty in giving God only the blame but not the glory. If God’s use of evolution does not remove God’s responsibility for the bad features that evolve (despite creaturely freedom), then why should it remove God’s responsibility for the good features that evolve? It therefore seems to me that the rejection of the evolutionary theodicy as unworkable should also lead to the rejection of evolutionary explanations as removing divine glory for biology.

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Kojonen, E.V.R. (2021). Indirect Design and the Revelatory Potential of Biology. In: The Compatibility of Evolution and Design. Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69683-2_5

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