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The Compatibility of Evolution and Design pp 59–95Cite as

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From Teleological Arguments to Thought Experiments

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Abstract

Before being able to understand the claim that design arguments and evolution must be opposed, we must first understand how design arguments work in the first place. This chapter examines the debate between those who hold that philosophical considerations are sufficient to undermine the biological design argument, and those who hold that belief in biological design was the most rational position before the Darwinian revolution. The idea of personal explanation, the nature of teleology, and the relationship between Thomistic and modern design arguments are also considered, and the conclusion is that the philosophical objections to the design argument are not yet sufficient for rejecting the argument.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Swinburne ’s discussion largely still assumes the old picture of deductive-nomological explanations as the norm in science. But this critique does not undermine Swinburne’s basic point that personal explanations can be explanatory even if they are different from scientific ones.

  2. 2.

    There is debate about whether intentional explanations should be considered as causal explanations. In the following, I treat them as causal explanations, but for the contrasting view, see Sehon (2005).

  3. 3.

    Collins argues that this holds for restricted multiverse hypotheses where the number of universes is not infinite and eternally existing, not for unrestricted multiverses where all logically possible worlds exist. But an infinite multiverse is highly problematic for other reasons, such as the Bolzmann brain problem.

  4. 4.

    Reiss (2009, 140) agrees that “Darwin introduced a teleological determinism into the heart of his theory. This teleology is expressed in two related conceptions: (1) that evolution is a process going from a less-adapted to a better-adapted state and (2) that natural selection is a deterministic force, or agent, that directs the evolutionary process toward this better-adapted state.” Reiss’ response is to argue for reinterpreting Darwin’s theory to remove the teleological elements, which in his view do not belong to this scientific theory.

  5. 5.

    A more extensive analysis of the matter can be found in Kojonen (2016, chapters 6, 7 and 8).

  6. 6.

    Behe ’s (2006, 256) design argument is also probabilistic. However, he is open to several different logical formulations of the argument. I have argued for understanding ID’s design arguments as utilizing IBE in Kojonen (2016, 135). The most importance exception to the trend is Dembski (1998b), who argues that design is detected by eliminating chance and law-like regularities as possible explanations by using the criterion of specified complexity. However, Dembski does also claim that we can in addition inductively link specified complexity and intelligence (Kojonen 2016, 130–133). It seems that such a positive link is essential for his argument to work, and it seems that something like the IBE is needed to supplement Dembski’s argument. See further Loikkanen (2019).

  7. 7.

    Elsewhere (Kojonen 2016, 145–147) I have accordingly argued the design argument could be a good and valuable argument even if alternative explanations are not eliminated.

  8. 8.

    Kitcher (1981) called this the “problem of spurious unification.” The problem is that if a pattern of explanation could fit any state of affairs, it cannot explain why this particular state obtains instead of any other. Similarly also Pennock (1999, 275).

  9. 9.

    Note that the thought experiments here are of a commonly accepted type, as they simply test our intuitions about explanations, and do not aim at proving the existence of metaphysical entities by linking conceivability and possibility.

  10. 10.

    Here I am using Pust’s (2019) definition of rational intuitions as “mental states in which a proposition seems true.”

  11. 11.

    To elaborate further, I would also argue that we can often be more certain that we know something than how we know this. Williamson (2000) famously defended a “knowledge-first” epistemology, arguing that epistemology should begin with clear examples of knowledge, and then construct an epistemological theory (insofar as this is even possible) that accounts for these examples. Following critics, I would want to say that it is important to understand epistemological principles (McGlynn 2014). Nevertheless, it seems to me that a theory of knowledge should at least be able to account for intuitively clear instances of knowledge, and similarly a theory of design detection should be able to make sense of the intuitively clear design detection in the case of the thought experiments. Many common critiques of design arguments presuppose a theory of design detection that is unable to make sense of these examples, and this is a problem for these critiques.

  12. 12.

    On refusing the question, and how the theist might respond, see Feser (2017, chapter 7) and Turner (2004, chapter 12).

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    E. V. R. Kojonen

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Kojonen, E.V.R. (2021). From Teleological Arguments to Thought Experiments. In: The Compatibility of Evolution and Design. Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69683-2_3

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