Skip to main content

The Function of Eidetic Sciences

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
  • 267 Accesses

Part of the book series: Contributions to Phenomenology ((CTPH,volume 114))

Abstract

In the present section we will take to the next level our previous discussion of the concept of eidos. In particular, we will discuss Husserl’s notion of eidetic or a priori sciences, with a special focus on geometry (which Husserl takes to be the most paradigmatic example of a priori, material sciences). In particular, we will argue that for Husserl the importance of geometry is that it perfectly epitomizes the function that he ascribes to every eidetic sciences, i.e., that of rationalizing the empirical world.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   99.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   129.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   129.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    For a systematic discussion of the relation between phenomenology and sciences, see the groundbreaking work by Trizio (2020).

  2. 2.

    For an extensive discussion of this topic, see Leclercq (2015). Also Derrida (1962) has been important for us.

  3. 3.

    For a further analysis, see also what Husserl will explain in the famous §31 of Formale und Transzendentale Logik on “The Pregnant Concept of Manifold and, Correlatively, that of a ‘Deductive’ and ‘Nomological System’ Clarified by the Concept of ‘Definiteness’” (Hua XVII, pp. 98–102), wherein Husserl clarifies, for example, that space in the Kantian sense is only an individual case of the analytic form of the “Euclidean manifold” (p. 98, footnote).

  4. 4.

    See for example Hua V, p. 23, where psychology, understood as an a priori science, is called “rational psychology”; and also Hua V, p. 78.

  5. 5.

    For instance, Husserl will speak of die methodische Fundamentierung (of experiential sciences such as empirical psychology) durch eine entsprechende apriorische Wissenschaft (Hua IX, p. 298). Or, as Husserl also insists in another passage, sciences as to matters of fact, namely, the sciences of the “world of experience,” can attain the level of “rigorous sciences” (echte Wissenschaften) solely by being traced back to the (essential) form of the relevant rational ontology (nur in der Rückbezogenheit auf diese Form) (Hua IX, p. 525). As he explains during his 1925 lectures on Phenomenological Psychology: “Empirically inductive natural science mounted an incomparably higher level of knowledge at that moment when it appropriated the mathematics of nature and recognized that the systematic formation of that a priori which belongs inseparably to nature provides ipso facto an infinity of absolutely necessary laws for factual nature. The same must hold for every experiential science. It must rise above the level of vague inductive empirical procedure. If it is to become rigorous science, its first concern must be to establish those essential laws that govern its province a priori, therefore, before any additional consideration of the contingently factual” (Hua IX, p. 49).

  6. 6.

    “For example, with regard to corporeal nature: pure mathematics, as the a priori whereby nature can be thought at all, makes possible genuine philosophical science and even mathematical natural science. Yet, this is more than just an example, since pure mathematics and mathematical natural science have allowed us to see, in an admittedly narrow sphere, exactly what it was that the original objectivistic idea of philosophy/science was striving for” (Hua XXVII, p. 167). For a discussion of this topic, see Hartimo (2010) and Ortiz Hill (2010). For an introduction to the topic in relation to Plato, see Crapanzano (2014) and De Caro (2012). On Husserl on Plato and geometry, see Majolino (2017).

References

  • Crapanzano, F. (2014). Koyré, Galileo e il “vecchio sogno” di Platone. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki.

    Google Scholar 

  • De Caro, M. (2012). Galileo e il platonismo fisico-matematico. In R. Chiaradonna (Ed.), Il platonismo e le science (pp. 123–142). Roma: Carocci.

    Google Scholar 

  • De Santis, D. (2019). “Das Wunder ist die Rationalität”: Remarks on Husserl on Kant’s Einbildungskraft and the idea of transcendental philosophy (with a note on Kurd Laßwitz). In The new yearbook for phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy (Vol. XVII, pp. 268–287).

    Google Scholar 

  • Derrida, J. (1962). Edmund Husserl, L’origine de la géométrie. Traduction et introduction par J. Derrida. Paris: PUF.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hartimo, M. (2010). The development of mathematics and the birth of phenomenology. In M. Hartimo (Ed.), Phenomenology and mathematics (pp. 107–121). Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London, New York: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, E. (1968). Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925. Hua IX. Den Haag: M. Nijhoff.

    Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, E. (1971). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Drittes Buch: Die Phänomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften. Hua V. Den Haag: M. Nijhoff.

    Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, E. (1974). Formale und transzendentale Logik. Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft. Hua XVII. Den Haag: M. Nijhoff.

    Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, E. (1976). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie. Hua III/1. Den Haag: M. Nijhoff.

    Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, E. (1989). Aufsätze und Vorträge (1922-1937). Hua XXVII. Den Haag. M. Nijhoff.

    Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, E. (2012). Einleitung in die Philosophie. Vorlesungen 1916-1920. Hua-Mat IX. Dordrecht, Heidelberg, New York, London: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leclercq, B. (2015). Fondements logiques et phénoménologiques de la rationalité mathématique chez Husserl. Paris: Vrin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Majolino, C. (2017). The infinite academy: Husserl on how to be a Platonist with some (Aristotelian?) help. In The new yearbook for phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy (Vol. XV, pp. 164–221).

    Google Scholar 

  • Ortiz Hill, C. (2010). Husserl on axiomatization and arithmetic. In M. Hartimo (Ed.), Phenomenology and mathematics (pp. 47–71). Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London, New York: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Trizio, E. (2020). Philosophy’s nature: Husserl’s phenomenology, natural science, and metaphysics. New York and London: Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Daniele De Santis .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2021 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

De Santis, D. (2021). The Function of Eidetic Sciences. In: Husserl and the A Priori. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 114. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69528-6_9

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics