Abstract
In a passage of his commentary on the Sentences, Gregory of Rimini tries to define different forms of knowledge (notitia) and discusses the differences between human and nonhuman knowledge. Most of his answer to the question of whether nonhuman animals have what he calls ‘complex knowledge’ (notitia complexa) is a critique of Wodeham’s argument against the ascription of the capacity of judging to nonhuman animals. Contrary to Wodeham, Gregory sees no problem in ascribing this capacity to other animals, as long as one makes certain distinctions between the judgments of humans and nonhuman animals. His debate with Wodeham is one of the few, if not the only, late-medieval example of a direct exchange of arguments regarding a specific cognitive capacity of animals. For this reason, his text is particularly interesting to read.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
For secondary literature on this debate, see the references in the introduction to Chap. 14.
- 3.
Knowledge in terms of ‘notitia’ is different from knowledge in terms of ‘scientia ’. While ‘scientia’ refers to knowledge of the causes of something, ‘notitia’ can also include some sort of familiarity, for instance, when one knows something because one has seen it before.
- 4.
Avicenna Latinus, Liber de anima IV.1, ed. van Riet (1968), 2.
- 5.
I.e. the different sensibles such as taste and colour.
- 6.
I.e. the animals.
- 7.
See note 4.
- 8.
- 9.
Avicenna Latinus, Liber de anima I.5, ed. Van Riet (1972), 89; see Chap. 4.
- 10.
- 11.
Averroes, Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros III.6, ed. Crawford (1953), 415 f.
- 12.
See Gregory of Rimini, Lectura super primum Sententiarum, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, eds. Trapp & Marcolino (1981), 309.
Bibliography
Primary Sources
Adam Wodeham. (1990). Lectura secunda in librum primum Sententiarum (R. Wood, Ed.). St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure University.
Gregory of Rimini. (1981). Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum (A. D. Trapp and V. Marcolino, Eds.). 2 vols. Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter.
Secondary Sources
Floridi, L. (1997). Scepticism and animal rationality: The fortune of Chrysippus’ dog in the history of western thought. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 79(1), 27–57.
Friedman, R. L., & Schabel, C. (2011). Gregory of Rimini. In H. Lagerlund (Ed.), Encyclopedia of medieval philosophy: Philosophy between 500 and 1500 (Vol. 1, pp. 439–444). Dordrecht: Springer.
Rescorla, M. (2009). Chrysippus’ dog as a case study in non-linguistic cognition. In R. W. Lurz (Ed.), The philosophy of animal minds (pp. 52–71). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zupko, J. (2002). Gregory of Rimini. In J. J. E. Gracia & T. B. Noone (Eds.), A companion to philosophy in the middle ages (pp. 283–290). Malden: Blackwell.
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Oelze, A. (2021). Judging (Gregory of Rimini, Lectura super primum Sententiarum, Distinction 3, Question 1, Article 1). In: Animal Minds in Medieval Latin Philosophy. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 27. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67012-2_15
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