Abstract
In his commentary on the Sentences, Adam Wodeham tries to account for sensory illusions. In his view, they result from erroneous judgments. However, he has to address the question of how nonhuman animals can also fall prey to such an illusion. Because if illusions are erroneous judgments and if animals fall prey to illusions, it follows that they are capable of judging. This means that they can affirm or negate that something is the case by ‘complex propositions’ (as judgments were defined by William Ockham). This view leads to various consequences which Wodeham is not ready to accept. Instead, he develops an interesting and intricate argument for a more parsimonious and less anthropomorphic explanation of animal behaviour.
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Notes
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- 3.
This example was quite popular even in antiquity. Auriol presumably took it from Aristotle, De insomniis 2, 460b26f., a short treatise transmitted as part of the so-called ‘Parva naturalia’. The example can also be found in Ptolemy’s Optics; see Smith (1996), 124. This text was translated into Latin in the twelfth century, see ibid., 7f.
- 4.
See Peter Auriol, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 3, s. 14, a. 1, n. 31, ed. Buytaert (1956), 696. Wodeham reproduces this explanation in Lectura secunda in librum primum Sententiarum, prol., q. 4, §7, ed. Wood (1990), 97.
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This refers to Peter Auriol, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 3, s. 14, a. 1, n. 31, ed. Buytaert (1956), 696, and his theory of apparent being; see the introduction above.
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I.e. William Ockham.
- 8.
John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa II (27), c. 41, n. 1, transl. Burgundii, ed. Buytaert (1955), 153.
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Oelze, A. (2021). Erring (Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda in librum primum Sententiarum, Prologue, Question 4, §8). In: Animal Minds in Medieval Latin Philosophy. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 27. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67012-2_14
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