Skip to main content

Erring (Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda in librum primum Sententiarum, Prologue, Question 4, §8)

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Animal Minds in Medieval Latin Philosophy

Part of the book series: Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind ((SHPM,volume 27))

  • 290 Accesses

Abstract

In his commentary on the Sentences, Adam Wodeham tries to account for sensory illusions. In his view, they result from erroneous judgments. However, he has to address the question of how nonhuman animals can also fall prey to such an illusion. Because if illusions are erroneous judgments and if animals fall prey to illusions, it follows that they are capable of judging. This means that they can affirm or negate that something is the case by ‘complex propositions’ (as judgments were defined by William Ockham). This view leads to various consequences which Wodeham is not ready to accept. Instead, he develops an interesting and intricate argument for a more parsimonious and less anthropomorphic explanation of animal behaviour.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    On his life and works, see Courtenay (1978); Wood (2003); Lahey (2011).

  2. 2.

    For a reconstruction, analysis, and evaluation, see Reina (1986); Tachau (1993), 665; Michon (2001), 326f.; Perler (2006), 89–94; Oelze (2018a), 121–129; Oelze (2018b), 189–194.

  3. 3.

    This example was quite popular even in antiquity. Auriol presumably took it from Aristotle, De insomniis 2, 460b26f., a short treatise transmitted as part of the so-called ‘Parva naturalia’. The example can also be found in Ptolemy’s Optics; see Smith (1996), 124. This text was translated into Latin in the twelfth century, see ibid., 7f.

  4. 4.

    See Peter Auriol, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 3, s. 14, a. 1, n. 31, ed. Buytaert (1956), 696. Wodeham reproduces this explanation in Lectura secunda in librum primum Sententiarum, prol., q. 4, §7, ed. Wood (1990), 97.

  5. 5.

    On this debate in particular, see Adriaenssen (2019). On Wodeham’s concept of judging, see also Perler (2008) and Pickavé (2012).

  6. 6.

    This refers to Peter Auriol, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 3, s. 14, a. 1, n. 31, ed. Buytaert (1956), 696, and his theory of apparent being; see the introduction above.

  7. 7.

    I.e. William Ockham.

  8. 8.

    John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa II (27), c. 41, n. 1, transl. Burgundii, ed. Buytaert (1955), 153.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

  • Adam Wodeham. (1990). Lectura secunda in librum primum Sententiarum (R. Wood, Ed.). St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure University.

    Google Scholar 

  • Aristotle. (1955). Parva naturalia (W. D. Ross, Ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • John of Damascus. (1955). De fide orthodoxa (E. M. Buytaert, Ed.). St. Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peter Auriol. (1952–1956). Scriptum super primum Sententiarum (E. M. Buytaert, Ed.). 2 vols. St. Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute.

    Google Scholar 

Secondary Sources

  • Adriaenssen, H. T. (2019). Peter Auriol and Adam Wodeham on perception and judgment. In B. Glenney & J. F. Silva (Eds.), The senses and the history of philosophy (pp. 149–162). Abingdon/New York: Routledge.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Courtenay, W. J. (1978). Adam Wodeham: An introduction to his life and writings. Leiden: Brill.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Lahey, S. E. (2011). Adam Wodeham. In H. Lagerlund (Ed.), Encyclopedia of medieval philosophy: Philosophy between 500 and 1500 (Vol. 1, pp. 20–24). Dordrecht: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Michon, C. (2001). Intentionality and proto-thoughts. In D. Perler (Ed.), Ancient and medieval theories of intentionality (pp. 325–341). Leiden/Boston/Köln: Brill.

    Google Scholar 

  • Oelze, A. (2018a). Animal rationality: Later medieval theories 1250–1350. Leiden/Boston: Brill.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Oelze, A. (2018b). Können Tiere irren? Philosophische Antworten aus dem 13. und 14. Jahrhundert. In A. Speer & M. Mauriège (Eds.), Irrtum – Error – Erreur (pp. 179–194). Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter.

    Google Scholar 

  • Perler, D. (2006). Intentionality and action: Medieval discussions on the cognitive capacities of animals. In M. C. Pacheco & J. F. Meirinhos (Eds.), Intellect et imagination dans la philosophie médiévale (Vol. 1, pp. 72–98). Turnhout: Brepols.

    Google Scholar 

  • Perler, D. (2008). Seeing and judging: Ockham and Wodeham on sensory cognition. In S. Knuuttila & P. Kärkkäinen (Eds.), Theories of perception in medieval and early modern philosophy (pp. 151–169). Dordrecht: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Pickavé, M. (2012). Emotion and cognition in later medieval philosophy: The case of Adam Wodeham. In M. Pickavé & L. Shapiro (Eds.), Emotion and cognitive life in medieval and early modern philosophy (pp. 94–115). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Reina, M. E. (1986). Un abozzo di polemica sulla psicologia animale: Gregorio da Rimini contro Adamo Wodeham. In C. Wenin (Ed.), L’homme et son univers au Moyen Âge (pp. 598–609). Louvain: Publications de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, A. M. (1996). Ptolemy’s theory of visual perception: An English translation of the optics. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tachau, K. H. (1993). What senses and intellect do: Argument and judgment in late medieval theories of knowledge. In K. Jacobi (Ed.), Argumentationstheorie: Scholastische Forschungen zu den logischen und semantischen Regeln korrekten Folgerns (pp. 653–668). Leiden: Brill.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wood, R. (2003). Adam of Wodeham. In J. J. E. Gracia & T. B. Noone (Eds.), A companion to philosophy in the middle ages (pp. 77–85). Malden: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2021 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Oelze, A. (2021). Erring (Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda in librum primum Sententiarum, Prologue, Question 4, §8). In: Animal Minds in Medieval Latin Philosophy. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 27. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67012-2_14

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics