Abstract
In the 6th chapter of Language, Truth and Logic (LTL), Ayer sketched a simple ethical theory that was later called emotivism. Emotivism faced serious objections since its inception. The most persistent objections directed at non-cognitivism were the formal ones, two of which will be dealt in this chapter: the indisputability of moral statements and the Frege-Geach problem. My aim is to draw inspiration from a parallel, noted by several philosophers (D. Berman, M. Warnock, and B. Belfrage), between Ayer’s emotivism and George Berkeley’s discussion of the multiple uses of language. By investigating competing interpretations concerning Berkeley’s remarks on the meaning of religious language, I conclude that one set of interpretations—the emotivist interpretation (that of D. Berman and B. Belfrage), which was highly influenced by Ayer and later emotivist theories—fares worse in relation to the overall Berkeleyan philosophical project than the other interpretation of Berkeley’s alleged emotivism (that of R. Jakapi and K. Williford)—which interprets Berkeley’s claim about religious mysteries in a quasi-realist and more contextualist way. Based on this interpretation of Berkeley, I propose a modification of the emotivism of LTL that preserves the truth-aptness of moral claims, even if only in a quasi-realist sense, and nevertheless keeps Ayer on an expressivist track.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
All page references to Language, Truth and Logic are to the second edition of 1946 see Ayer (1936/1946), noted in the text as “LTL.” The paper is supported by the MTA BTK Lendület Morals and Science Research Group and by the “Empiricism and atomism in the twentieth-century Anglo-Saxon philosophy” NKFIH project (124970).
- 2.
Ayer’s non-cognitivism and his ethics are discussed further in Aaron Preston’s chapters.
- 3.
On the details of verification, see Hans-Johann Glock’s chapter in this volume.
- 4.
Here I simply repeat and apply Ayer’s terminology. He uses this term to refer to Moorean intuitionism, since the intuitionists maintain that moral truths are objective and justifiable only by intellectual intuitions. In using this term, I am not referring to the absolutely binding nature of moral rules, which is moral absolutism in the modern sense.
- 5.
Ayer refers the reader to Moore’s Philosophical Studies: “The Nature of Moral Philosophy” (LTL, 114).
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
One of these criticisms came from Peter Browne, who was mentioned earlier in Footnote 7.
- 9.
An additional interpretation is also available on these matters that provides an alternative to the two discussed above. Kenneth Pearce (2017) argues that talk of religious mysteries should be considered only a special case of Berkeley’s general theory of meaning; in this sense, his interpretation is closer to that of Williford and Jakapi’s. Although every language use is a rule-governed manipulation of signs (words), it is essential for the meaningfulness of the system of signs to be connected to the practical deeds and life of their users. In this respect, the source of meaning for religious language is the influence it bears on the believer’s life. However, this does not mean that statements about mysteries or God him-/herself are not descriptive, since they function in exactly the same way as statements about ordinary persons or the characters of them. As spirits, neither God nor any person can be represented, but talk of them is essentially governed by the same rules. However, I believe that giving preference to Pearce’s interpretation over that of Williford and Jakapi would not cause any significant alterations to my concluding section.
References
Ayer, Alfred J. 1936/1946. Language, Truth and Logic. 2nd ed. London: Victor Gollancz.
———. 1949/1972. On the Analysis of Moral Judgements. In Philosophical Essays, 213–249. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
———. 1973. The Central Questions of Philosophy. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
———. 1984. Freedom and Morality. In Freedom and Morality and Other Essays, 1–50. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Belfrage, Bertil. 1986. Berkeley’s Theory of Emotive Meaning (1708). History of European Ideas 7 (6): 643–649.
Berkeley, George. 1710/1949. [PHK] A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. In The Works of George Berkeley Bishop of Cloyne, Vol. 2, ed. A.A. Luce and T.E. Jessop, 1–114. London: Nelson.
———. 1732/1964. [A] Alciphron: Or, the Minute Philosopher. In The Works of George Berkeley Bishop of Cloyne, Vol. 3, ed. A.A. Luce and T.E. Jessop. London: Nelson.
———. 1708/1987. [MI] Manuscript Introduction. In George Berkeley’s Manuscript Introduction: An Edition Diplomatica, ed. Bertil Belfrage. Oxford: Doxa.
Berman, David. 1981. Cognitive Theology and Emotive Mysteries in Berkeley’s Alciphron. Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy 81 (7): 219–229.
———. 1994. George Berkeley: Idealism and the Man. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Geach, Peter. 1965. Assertion. Philosophical Review 24: 449–465.
Jakapi, Roomet. 2002. Emotive Meaning and Christian Mysteries in Berkeley’s Alciphron. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 10 (3): 401–411.
Joad, C.E.M. 1948. Logical Positivism, Fascism and Value. New Statesman, July 31, 91–92.
McIntyre, Alasdair C. 1990. After Virtue. London: Duckworth.
Pearce, Kenneth L. 2017. Language and the Structure of Berkeley’s World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Satris, Stephen. 1987. Ethical Emotivism. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Schroeder, Mark. 2008. What Is the Frege-Geach Problem? Philosophy Compass 3 (4): 703–720.
———. 2010. Noncognitivism in Ethics. London: Routledge.
Silk, Alex. 2017. Metaethical Contextualism. In The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, ed. T. McPherson and D. Plunkett, 102–118. London: Routledge.
Toland, John. 1702. Christianity Not Mysterious. London.
Tuboly, Adam Tamas. 2020. A Cricket Game, a Train Ticket and a Vacuum to be Filled: Ayer’s Logical Positivism as a Focal Point For Post-war British Cultural Struggles. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2020.1731681.
Warnock, Mary. 1966. Ethics Since 1900. London: Oxford University Press.
Williford, Kenneth. 2003. Berkeley’s Theory of Operative Language in the Manuscript Introduction. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 11 (2): 271–301.
Williford, Kenneth, and Roomet Jakapi. 2009. Berkeley’s Theory of Meaning in Alciphron VII. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17 (1): 99–118.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2021 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Pete, K. (2021). Ayer and Berkeley on the Meaning of Ethical and Religious Language. In: Tuboly, A.T. (eds) The Historical and Philosophical Significance of Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic. History of Analytic Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50884-5_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50884-5_10
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-50883-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-50884-5
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)