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Alias Resolution Based on ICMP Rate Limiting

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCCN,volume 12048))

Abstract

Alias resolution techniques (e.g., Midar) associate, mostly through active measurement, a set of IP addresses as belonging to a common router. These techniques rely on distinct router features that can serve as a signature. Their applicability is affected by router support of the features and the robustness of the signature. This paper presents a new alias resolution tool called Limited Ltd. that exploits ICMP rate limiting, a feature that is increasingly supported by modern routers that has not previously been used for alias resolution. It sends ICMP probes toward target interfaces in order to trigger rate limiting, extracting features from the probe reply loss traces. It uses a machine learning classifier to designate pairs of interfaces as aliases. We describe the details of the algorithm used by Limited Ltd. and illustrate its feasibility and accuracy. Limited Ltd. not only is the first tool that can perform alias resolution on IPv6 routers that do not generate monotonically increasing fragmentation IDs (e.g., Juniper routers) but it also complements the state-of-the-art techniques for IPv4 alias resolution. All of our code and the collected dataset are publicly available.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    We have explicitly verified that the actual probing rate is not limited by the network card or other factors.

  2. 2.

    The largest reported alias set by Midar and Speedtrap has 43 interfaces. Therefore, the likelihood of observing 50 candidate interfaces that are all aliases is low.

  3. 3.

    Limited Ltd. maintains the flow ID necessary to reach \(\kappa _s\) in subsequent probing of s and \(\kappa _s\).

  4. 4.

    https://gitlab.planet-lab.eu/cartography.

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Acknowledgments

We thank Niels den Otter from SURFnet and Simon Leinen from Switch network for their time in conducting joint experiments of Limited Ltd. We thank people from Internet2 and Switch for providing the ground truth of their network. We thank the anonymous reviewers from both the PAM TPC and our shepherd, for their careful reading of this paper and suggestions for its improvement. Kevin Vermeulen, Olivier Fourmaux, and Timur Friedman are associated with Sorbonne Université, CNRS, Laboratoire d’informatique de Paris 6, LIP6, F-75005 Paris, France. Kevin Vermeulen and Timur Friedman are associated with the Laboratory of Information, Networking and Communication Sciences, LINCS, F-75013 Paris, France. A research grant from the French Ministry of Defense has made this work possible.

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Correspondence to Kevin Vermeulen , Burim Ljuma , Vamsi Addanki , Matthieu Gouel , Olivier Fourmaux , Timur Friedman or Reza Rejaie .

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A Ethical Considerations

A Ethical Considerations

1.1 A.1 Precautions Taken

We take two precautions, that we understand to be community best practice: We sent all probing traffic from IP addresses that were clearly associated via WhoIs with their host locations, either at our institution or others hosting PlanetLab Europe nodes. We have also set up a web server on the probing machines with a contact email, so that any network operators could opt out from our experiment. We received no notice whatsoever from network operators expressing concern about our measurements. Though this is a positive sign, it could be that there are impacts that were not noticed, or that the concerns did not reach us. We therefore pushed our examination further, as detailed in the following sections.

Fig. 5.
figure 5

Maximum loss rates

1.2 A.2 Impact on Other Measurements

Limited Ltd. ’s \(\mathtt {find\_rate}()\) aims to find an ICMP Echo Request probing rate that produces an Echo Reply trace with a loss rate in the [0.05, 0.10] range. While it is searching for this rate, it can induce a loss rate above 0.10. If it does so, it proceeds to a binary search to find a lower probing rate for which traces falls within the desired range. Figure 5 shows that loss rates can go as high as 0.60.

The impact on reachability for the IP addresses of that node is that there is a worst case 0.60 probability that a single ping packet to such an address will not receive a response if it arrives at the node during the five seconds of highest rate probing time. Most pings occur in series of packets, so the worst case probabilities are 0.36 for two ping packets being lost, 0.22 for three, 0.13 for four, 0.08 for five, and 0.05 for six. These are worst case probabilities for the five seconds at highest loss rate. Average reachability failure probabilities are 0.22 for one ping packet, 0.05 for two, 0.01 for three, and so on, while a node is being probed at its highest rate. To judge whether such a level of interference with other measurements is exceptional, we compare it to the impact of the state-of-the-art Midar tool. Midar has a phase during which it elicits three series of 30 responses each, using different methods for each series: TCP SYN packets, to elicit TCP RST or TCP SYN-ACK responses; UDP packets to a high port number, to elicit ICMP Destination Unreachable responses; and ICMP Echo Request packets, to elicit ICMP Echo Reply responses [26]. The probing rate is very low compared to Limited Ltd.: a mere 100 packets per second across multiple addresses. This is not a concern for the TCP and ICMP probing. However, the UDP probing taps into an ICMP rate limiting mechanism that tends to be much less robust than the typical ICMP Echo Reply mechanism on some routers. ICMP Destination Unreachable messages are often rate limited at 2 packets per second, which is \(1/500^\mathrm {th}\) the typical rate at which ICMP Echo Reply messages are rate limited. (For example, the default rate at which Cisco routers limit ICMP Destination Unreachable messages is 1 every 500 ms.)

Fig. 6.
figure 6

Example erroneous traceroute result

We found that, when an IP address is a traceroute destination, Midar can completely block ICMP Destination Unreachable messages coming from that destination. Figure 6 illustrates the impact. The figure shows two traceroute results, the top one from before or after Midar being run, and the bottom one during Midar probing. During the Midar run, we see that traceroute receives no responses while it is probing hop 15, where the destination is in fact to be found. The normal functioning of traceroute is to continue probing at higher and higher hop counts. Only a few seconds later, when traceroute is sending probes to hop 20, does it start to receive ICMP Destination Unreachable messages from the destination. The result is an erroneous traceroute, indicating that the destination is five hops further away than it actually is. We observed this erroneous traceroute effect on 2,196 IP addresses out of a dataset of 10,000 IPv4 addresses collected from across the Internet. For both Limited Ltd. and Midar, transient interference with other measurements can be observed for the few seconds during which an IP address is being probed. Our conclusion is not that the diminution in ping reachability induced by Limited Ltd. is necessarily anodyne. Care should be taken to circumscribe this effect. But we observe that it does not stand out in terms of its impact on other measurements.

CPU Usage. We now examine the CPU overhead generated by Limited Ltd., and its potential impact on the forwarding plane and other features involving the CPU. We have run an experiment in a local network with our own Cisco (model 3825, IOS 12.3) and Juniper (model J4350, JunOS 8.0R2.8) routers. The experiment consists in measuring three metrics while \(\mathtt {find\_rate}()\) routine of Limited Ltd., which has the highest probing rate, is running. We measured: (1) The CPU usage of the router, (2) the throughput of a TCP connection between the two end hosts, and (3) the rate of BGP updates. ICMP rate limiting is configured on both our Juniper and Cisco routers with an access list [10, 21], limiting the ICMP input bandwidth destined to the router to 1,000 packets per second, which is the default configuration on Juniper routers.

TCP throughput was unaffected, at an average of 537 Mbps and BGP updates remained constant at 10 per second. CPU usage was at 5% for Cisco and 15% for Juniper when Limited Ltd. was not probing. During the probing, the maximum overhead was triggered for both at a maximum probing rate of 2,048 packets per second, with a peak at 10% for Cisco and 40% for Juniper during 5 s. Our conclusion is that there is an impact of high probing rates on CPU, but we do not witness a disruptive impact on either the data plane (TCP throughput) or the control plane (BGP update rate).

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Vermeulen, K. et al. (2020). Alias Resolution Based on ICMP Rate Limiting. In: Sperotto, A., Dainotti, A., Stiller, B. (eds) Passive and Active Measurement. PAM 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12048. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44081-7_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44081-7_14

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