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The Epistemic Benefits of Disagreement pp 3–17Cite as

Introduction to the Epistemology of Disagreement

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Part of the book series: Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics ((SAPERE,volume 51))

Abstract

Part of the recent explosion in the literature on the epistemology of disagreement has generally confined itself to the following problem: Suppose that after an agent comes to believe proposition P she finds out that there is an epistemic peer—someone of equal intelligence and ability—who has evaluated the same body of evidence and come to believe not-P. What should her reaction be upon discovering peer disagreement? Does the existence of peer disagreement constitute a (partial) defeater to her original belief that P? Or is she rationally permitted to maintain her belief that P even in the face of peer disagreement? In this chapter I outline the main arguments for conciliationism and non-conciliationism.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In Chap. 3 we will see that it very much matters how one defines peerhood, but for now this is sufficient.

  2. 2.

    This view is also known as revisionism. A particularly strong form is known as the equal weight view.

  3. 3.

    This view is also known as non-conciliationism or steadfast-ness.

  4. 4.

    Kelly 2010; Lackey 2010a, b and Wietmarschen (2013) offer hybrid views that sometimes recommend conciliating and sometimes do not. However, these are minority views in the literature, and I will defer discussing them until Chap. 6. Besong 2017 responds to Lackey’s hybrid account. Everett 2015 offers a hybrid view by distinguishing between two different types of rational belief.

  5. 5.

    This response appears similar to Feldman 2009.

  6. 6.

    See Jehle and Fitelson 2009 for the difficulties involved in formulating the equal weight view in a Bayesian framework. Elkin and Wheeler 2018 also argue a Bayesian framework cannot accommodate the type of updating mandated by conciliationism. Heesen and Kolk 2016 take a game-theoretical approach to conciliationism. Martini 2013 argues that belief updating does not solve questions about how to respond to epistemic peer disagreement.

  7. 7.

    See also Brossel and Eder 2014, Grundmann 2013, Lam 2013, Wiland 2016.

  8. 8.

    For an excellent survey of some of the major themes in the literature see Matheson 2015b.

  9. 9.

    Interestingly Ballantyne argues that sceptics about the amount of genuine disagreement in philosophy are also committed to scepticism about cases of apparent agreement in philosophy, He writes, “[i]f we think philosophers cannot tell the difference between genuine and verbal disagreements, we should not expect them to tell the difference between genuine and verbal agreements, either” (Ballantyne 2016, 759). Thus, scepticism about the amount of disagreement is traded for another type of scepticism.

  10. 10.

    The introduction of Ballantyne 2016 provides an excellent survey of these issues. See also Chalmers 2011, Chalmers et al. 2009, Graham 2014, Jackson 2014, Jenkins 2014, Rott 2015. Rowbottom 2016 discusses the conditions needing to be met for agreement from a formal perspective.

  11. 11.

    Ribeiro also explains that this relativistic response can be found in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty (1969) where disagreement is attributed to the fact that people use different sets of rules, but there is no objective set of rules. See Ribeiro 2011, 8–9.

  12. 12.

    See also Hazlett 2014a.

  13. 13.

    For exceptions see Boyce and Hazlett 2016, Carter 2016, Tebben 2013.

  14. 14.

    de Ridder 2014 is an exception.

  15. 15.

    This conciliationist response assumes that the Uniqueness Thesis is true. This is the view, roughly, that there is only one unique rational response to any given body of evidence. I discuss uniqueness in Chap. 4.

  16. 16.

    See also Matheson 2015a. Moon 2018 defends a modified version of Independence. Lord 2014 rejects Independence and related principles. Lord points out that Independence has gained significance in other philosophical debates: Copp 2007 relies on it in defending moral independence. Independence is also appealed to in evolutionary debunking arguments found in Street 2011 and Vavova 2014a. I will not discuss these connections any further in this project.

  17. 17.

    Matheson offers this argument within the context of ‘idealized’ disagreements where two peers are close cognitive and evidential equals. In Chap. 3 I explore whether lessons from idealized disagreements apply seamlessly to real-world disputes.

  18. 18.

    See also Kripke 2011.

  19. 19.

    Interestingly, in discussing peer disagreement with philosophers not researching in the epistemology of disagreement this type of special insight and emphasis on autonomy is the most common response I have encountered. Admittedly, my evidence for this is highly anecdotal, but rarely have I encountered a philosopher who seems very much troubled by peer disagreement. The explanation for this, I think, is that at least implicitly many philosophers believe they hold special insights that those who are otherwise their epistemic peers lack. This is not only the case for philosophers and philosophical beliefs, but the same also holds for those with strong political, ethical, and religious beliefs.

  20. 20.

    Related to the special insight view is the idea that in cases of disagreement, if an agent suspends judgment or lowers confidence it would violate her epistemic autonomy. Conciliationism forces the agent to arbitrarily submit to another person’s authority, rather than trusting her own insight (Elga 2007, 485). Perhaps each person is rational to maintain her own beliefs when faced with disagreement because of enjoying special insight and prima facie epistemic autonomy.

  21. 21.

    Interestingly, Matheson 2015a argues that the scepticism entailed by disagreement on a variety of controversial moral actions implies that we should exercise moral caution and refrain from those actions. This is a rare application of the disagreement literature to applied ethics. See also Vavova 2014b.

  22. 22.

    Sosa (2010) does reject conciliationism, in part, because it leads to scepticism. See also Rotondo 2015 and Machuca 2013, 2015.

  23. 23.

    Pittard’s view is more complex than the way I have explained it here. He argues for a moderate conciliationist position in which less controversial conciliationist principles are not subject to self-referential worries, but more controversial conciliationist principles may have to be given up (or less confidently believed) in the face of disagreement. See Pittard (2015) for more details. For more on the self-referential worry see also Weintraub 2013. Weintraub explores whether it is rational for both conciliationists and non-conciliationists to remain steadfast in their positions on disagreement, even in the face of peer disagreement about their respective views. Sampson (forthcoming) responds to Pittard and argues that the self-referential objection cannot be solved.

  24. 24.

    See Reining 2016a, 308–312 for an excellent survey of the self-referential incoherence objection. Reining himself argues that in cases of disagreement “one is rationally … required to treat the disagreement as a pro tanto reason to significantly lower one’s confidence in one’s initial opinion” (Reining 2016a, 322). Understanding disagreement as a pro tanto reason avoids the self-referential problems other views suffer from. Christensen 2013 argues that in cases where the self-reference worry arises one epistemic norm of rationality will necessarily be violated, but I will take it for granted that a reply which recommends irrationality (in some sense) is highly implausible.

  25. 25.

    See Popkin 1967, 459. For more solutions to the self-reference problem see Bogardus 2009 and Graves 2013. Decker 2014 argues that the self-reference problem is unresolvable. See also Machuca 2017, Mulligan 2015. Psaroudaki 2016 and Stewart 2016.

  26. 26.

    For a recent discussion of van Inwagen see Bogner et al. 2018.

  27. 27.

    See Foley 2001, Pasnau 2015, Schafer 2015 and Rattan 2014.

  28. 28.

    Schwitzgebel 2008 argues introspection is unreliable.

  29. 29.

    In a more recent article Bergmann does in fact offer an argument from intuitions against conciliating in the face of disagreement, specifically with respect to religious beliefs. He applies solutions to external world scepticism to support non-conciliationism about non-inferred religious beliefs. See Bergmann 2017 for more.

  30. 30.

    See also Fritz 2018.

  31. 31.

    I discuss additional cases in support of both conciliationism and non-conciliationism extensively in Chap. 2.

  32. 32.

    Christensen 2016 discusses types of higher-order evidence other than disagreement. Another way of construing higher-order evidence, at least with respect to peer disagreement, is ‘evidence of evidence is evidence’. See also Roche 2014. Tal and Comesana 2017 responds and Roche (2018) offers a rejoinder.

  33. 33.

    See also Konigsberg 2013.

  34. 34.

    See also Titelbaum 2015. Kelly 2010 is a distinct move away from this position. Rasmussen et al. 2018 formalize a higher-order approach to disagreement. See also Silwa and Horowitz 2015.

  35. 35.

    This is related to issues about epistemic values that I discuss in Chap. 6. This example also assumes that their wrong judgments do not overlap.

  36. 36.

    Zach Barnett (2019) argues that if experts are expected to reach the same conclusion, much epistemic weight ought to be given to it.

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    Kirk Lougheed

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Lougheed, K. (2020). Introduction to the Epistemology of Disagreement. In: The Epistemic Benefits of Disagreement. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 51. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34503-7_1

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