Abstract
Is there any fruitful interplay between philosophy and neuroscience? In this paper, we provide four case studies showcasing that: (i) Philosophical questions can be tackled by recruiting neuroscientific evidence; (ii) the epistemological reflections of philosophers contribute to tackle some foundational issues of (cognitive) neuroscience. (i) will be supported by the analysis of the literature on picture perception and Molyneux’s question; (ii) will be supported by the analysis of the literature on forward and reverse inferences. We conclude by providing some philosophical reflections on the interpretation of these cases.
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Notes
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The expression is by Dennett (2009).
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For example, those pertaining to the parieto-premotor circuit AIP-F5, within the ventro-dorsal pathway.
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Vol. 42.
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We wish to thank the audience of the 2017 Italian Association for Cognitive Science, as well as the audience of the 2017 Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy, for offering several good questions to an earlier draft of this project. We also want to thank those scholars who discussed with us about these topics: Silvano Zipoli Caiani, Giorgia Committeri, Bence Nanay, Andrea Borghini, Brian B. Glenney, Fabrizio Calzavarini, Gustavo Cevolani, Enzo Crupi. We also thank two anonymous reviewers for the comments.
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Ferretti, G., Viola, M. (2019). How Philosophical Reasoning and Neuroscientific Modeling Come Together. In: Nepomuceno-Fernández, Á., Magnani, L., Salguero-Lamillar, F., Barés-Gómez, C., Fontaine, M. (eds) Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. MBR 2018. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 49. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32722-4_11
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