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An Exposition of Personhood as Moral Theory

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An African Philosophy of Personhood, Morality, and Politics

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Abstract

In this chapter, Molefe elaborates the idea of personhood as a moral theory. He conducts this discussion in a three-fold manner: Molefe begins by clarifying the relationship between being human and being a person; three such relationships are discussed. Next, he considers the agent-centred (character-based) nature of this moral theory. Two implications are drawn from the character-based nature of the discourse of personhood: (1) the meta-ethical view of humanism and (2) moral individualism. Finally, Molefe considers the role of social relationships in the moral discourse on personhood. He concludes by interpreting personhood to be a deontological egoistic perfectionist moral theory.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa

    Motsamai Molefe

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  1. Motsamai Molefe
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Correspondence to Motsamai Molefe .

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Molefe, M. (2019). An Exposition of Personhood as Moral Theory. In: An African Philosophy of Personhood, Morality, and Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15561-2_3

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