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Formalization of Cognitive-Agent Systems, Trust, and Emotions

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Abstract

A cognitive agent is an agent characterized by properties that are generally attributed to humans. Cognition is viewed here as a general mechanism of reasoning (in contrast with reactive agents) about knowledge. Such agents can perceive their environment, reason about fact or epistemic states of other agents, have a decision making process, etc. This article presents the main concepts used in cognitive agents formalizations, and speak about two particular concepts related to humans: trust and emotion. The language used for cognitive agents is here a logical language because it particularly fits well for both knowledge representation and reasoning formalization. But, even if trust and emotion can be both easily formalized by logical languages, we show that some numerical models are also well adapted.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Note that the word agent comes from Latin language agere and means to act, to do.

  2. 2.

    These logics are often called BDI logics (for belief, desire, intention). By analogy, we speak also of BDI agents (systems).

  3. 3.

    Their paper in Artificial Intelligence has received the AAMAS most influential paper award in 2008.

  4. 4.

    This explains by the way the success of the theory of linguistic actions (Austin 1962; Searle 1969) in the agent community: in those theories, the language is seen as the accomplishment of actions, facilitating de facto the formal union of physical and linguistic actions.

  5. 5.

    http://www.fipa.org/repository/aclspecs.html.

  6. 6.

    That is, a concept constructed from lower-level concepts.

  7. 7.

    In the present work, we only consider qualitative approaches to the notion of belief. We do not discuss the quantitative approaches formalizing degrees of belief (see e.g. (Laverny and Lang 2005)).

  8. 8.

    Besides BDI logics, the operator \( After _{\alpha }\,\) is often denoted by \([\alpha ]\).

  9. 9.

    One could think that this should be a sufficient but not necessary condition. Indeed, it suffices that Agent i believes Agent j will be capable of executing Action \(\alpha \) in time to achieve Goal \(\varphi \). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that we formalize a notion of trust “right here, right now”, not a notion of potential trust.

  10. 10.

    Plato clearly establishes a distinction between reason, passion, and desire.

  11. 11.

    It is a system based on the Tok architecture of the project Oz. See http://www.cs.cmu.edu/afs/cs.cmu.edu/project/oz/web/.

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Correspondence to Jonathan Ben-Naim .

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Ben-Naim, J., Longin, D., Lorini, E. (2020). Formalization of Cognitive-Agent Systems, Trust, and Emotions. In: Marquis, P., Papini, O., Prade, H. (eds) A Guided Tour of Artificial Intelligence Research. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-06164-7_19

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