Abstract
Early theories of bureaucracy tended to be dominated by Weberian1 notions of impartial, efficient service by government officials concerned to serve the public interest as interpreted by their elected governments. Economists for the most part took little account, in analyzing market failure and recommending bureaucratic interventions, of the undercurrent of popular criticism of bureaucrats on grounds of laziness, insensitivity to citizen preferences, and of self-seeking behavior assumed in the theory of the firm.
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© 1988 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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Rowley, C.K., Elgin, R. (1988). Government and Its Bureaucracy: A Bilateral Bargaining Versus a Principal-Agent Approach. In: Rowley, C.K., Tollison, R.D., Tullock, G. (eds) The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking. Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy, vol 1. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-1963-5_20
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-1963-5_20
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
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