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Dispositions Do Explain

Picking Up the Pieces after Hurricane Walter

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Annals of Theoretical Psychology

Abstract

It is hard to choose between laughter and tears in reacting to Weimer’s fulminations against dispositional concepts in psychology. I guess that turns on the importance one places in matters methodological on trying to get it right instead of putting on a show. Some folks admire polemical posturings and grand oratory; others prefer analysis and tight argument.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Advanced Study in Theoretical Psychology, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, T6G 2E9, Canada

    William W. Rozeboom

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  1. William W. Rozeboom
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Advanced Study in Theoretical Psychology, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada

    Joseph R. Royce  & Leendert P. Mos  & 

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© 1984 Plenum Press, New York

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Rozeboom, W.W. (1984). Dispositions Do Explain. In: Royce, J.R., Mos, L.P. (eds) Annals of Theoretical Psychology. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-6450-8_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-6450-8_13

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4615-6452-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4615-6450-8

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