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Abstract

MANY speech acts are intentional, that is, they are speech acts about something. In intentional speech acts we often give a description of something, that is, we say what characteristics that thing has. Such characteristics are often widely different. Among others we may distinguish three kinds of characteristics: directly observable characteristics, dispositional characteristics and impressive characteristics. I have to take only one glance at a cat to see whether it is black. ‘Black’ is, in this sense, a directly observable characteristic of the cat. Dispositional characteristics are not directly observable in this sense. I would have to watch the cat over a longer period and under certain circumstances in order to ascertain whether it is treacherous. Dispositions (or tendencies) towards certain kinds of behaviour are only manifested under specific circumstances. As long as the required circumstances are absent, the dispositions cannot be observed. Some things have the disposition (or tendency) to impress the sensitive observer in some way, or to evoke a certain emotion or attitude in those who encounter them. Thus, for example, the panoramic view from the Zugspitze is impressive in the sense that it tends to evoke feelings of awe etc. in those enjoying it. In this case we may speak of impressive characteristics.

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© 1981 Vincent Brümmer

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Brümmer, V. (1981). The Ascription of Meaning. In: Theology and Philosophical Inquiry. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17387-7_9

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