The Path to Suez: Britain and the Struggle for the Middle East, 1953–56

Abstract

The Suez Affair was the culmination of futile British attempts to maintain its position in the Middle East between 1953 and 1956. Explanations that perceive the dispute as a cold war conflict or attribute it to the irrationality or ill health of British Prime Minister Anthony Eden or the megalomania of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser have the virtue of simplicity, but add little to the historical perspective of the crisis. Further, by looking simply at Britain’s involvement in the day to day events of July to November 1956, the historian risks misleading conclusions about the causes and Britain’s part in the Suez crisis, which in turn diverts attention from other motives and events that shaped her policies as well as those of France, the United States and the countries of the Middle East during the mid-1950s.