As communities grow in size over time from just a few people to hundreds and then thousands, members frequently find that they feel less involved, that the community lacks relevance, and that their trust in the community as a friendly place is gone. A prime example of this is online message boards or other communities developed around social interaction which are renowned for becoming bogged down in endless arguments and spamming as they increase in size. The same ideas apply to online trading systems such as eBay which require a far higher degree of trust and reliability. We follow a game theoretic model of frequent interactions over time between reactive agents to examine the conditions under which a population is likely to find a set of strategies which allow them to cooperate a sufficient percentage of the time to remain viable.
Chapter PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Keywords
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
References
W. T. Au and J. Kwong. Contemporary Psychological Research on Social Dilemmas. Cambridge UP, 2004.
R. Axelrod. The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books, New York, 1984.
A.L.C. Bazzan, A.P. Cavalheiro Influence of Social Attachment in a Small-World Network of Agents Playing the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.5th Workshop of Game Theoretic and Decision Theoretic Agents, 2003
K. Binmore, L. Samuelson Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Games Played by Finite Automata. Journal of Economic Theory, 57(2):278-305, 1992.
R. Boyd, P.J. Richerson Culture and the Evolutionary Process. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1985
C. Dellarocas. The digitization of word-of-mouth: Promise and challenges of online feedback mechanisms. Management Science, 49(10):1407-1424, 2003.
R.I.M. Dunbar. Neocortex size as a constraint on group size in primates. Journal of Human Evolution 22:469-493, 1992.
Friedman, E. and Resnick, P. The Social Cost of Cheap Pseudonyms Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 10 (2):173-199, 2001.
D. Fundenberg, E. Maskin. The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information. Econometrica, 54(3):533-554, 1986.
D. J.-F. de Quervain, U. Fischbacher, V. Treyer, M. Schellhammer, U. Schnyder, A. Buck, and E. Fehr. The neural basis of altruistic punishment. Science, 305:1254-1258, 2004.
B. Lomborg. Nucleus and shield: The evolution of social structure in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. American Sociological Review, 61(2):278-307, 1996.
R. Martin-Hughes, J. Renz Examining the Motivations of Defection in Large-Scale Open Systems. (to appear) ACM Symposium on Applied Computing, 2008.
M.E.J. Newman The Structure and Function of Complex Networks. SIAM Review, 45(2):167-256, 2003.
A. Rapoport A Note on the ”Index of Cooperation” for Prisoner’s Dilemma. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 11(1, Law and Conflict Resolution):100-103, 1967.
B. Skyrms. Evolution of the Social Contract. Cambridge University Press, 1996.
E. Xiao, D. Houser Emotion Expression in Human Punishment Behavior Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Vol. 102(20), pp. 7398-7401, 2005.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2008 IFIP International Federation for Information Processing
About this paper
Cite this paper
Martin-Hughes, R. (2008). Cooperation in Growing Communities. In: Karabulut, Y., Mitchell, J., Herrmann, P., Jensen, C.D. (eds) Trust Management II. IFIPTM 2008. IFIP – The International Federation for Information Processing, vol 263. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-09428-1_13
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-09428-1_13
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-0-387-09427-4
Online ISBN: 978-0-387-09428-1
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)