Abstract
In this paper, the possibility of developing a Heideggerian solution to the Schizophrenia Problem associated with Cognitive Technology is investigated. This problem arises as a result of the computer bracketing emotion from cognition during human-computer interaction and results in human psychic self-amputation. It is argued that in order to solve the Schizophrenia Problem, it is necessary to first solve the ‘hard problem” of consciousness since emotion is at least partially experiential. Heidegger’s thought, particularly as interpreted by Hubert Dreyfus, appears relevant in this regard since it ostensibly provides the basis for solving the ‘hard problem’ via the construction of artificial systems capable of the emergent generation of conscious experience. However, it will be shown that Heidegger’s commitment to a non-experiential conception of nature renders this whole approach problematic, thereby necessitating consideration of alternative,post-Heideggerian approaches to solving the Schizophrenia Problem.
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Ali, S.M. (2001). “The End of the (Dreyfus) Affair”:(Post)Heideggerian Meditations on Man, Machine, and Meaning. In: Beynon, M., Nehaniv, C.L., Dautenhahn, K. (eds) Cognitive Technology: Instruments of Mind. CT 2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 2117. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44617-6_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44617-6_15
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