Abstract
For an electronic election to be fully democratic there is a need for security mechanisms that will assure the privacy of the voters. With receipt-free electronic voting, a voter neither obtains nor is able to construct a receipt proving the content of her vote. In this paper we first consider the minimal requirements for receipt-free elections, without untappable communication channels between the voter and the voting authorities. We then propose a solution, which satisfies these requirements. This solution is based on an encryption blackbox, which uses its own randomness. Finally we present an implementation with smartcards, suitable for Internet voting.
Chapter PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Keywords
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
References
Benaloh J, Tuinstra D. Receipt-free secret-ballot elections. Proceedings of the 26th ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing; ACM, 1994; 544–553.
Sako K, Killian J. Receipt-free mix-type voting schemes — a practical solution to the implementation of voting booth. Proceedings of EUROCRYPT’ 95, LNCS; Springer-Verlag, 1995; 921:393–403.
Alpert D, Ellard D, Kavazovic O, Scheff M. Receipt-free secure elections 6.857 final project. 6.857 Network and Computer Security, 1998; http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/~ellard/6.857/final.ps.
Hirt M, Sako K. Efficient receipt-free voting based on homomorphic encryption. Proceedings of EUROCRYPT 2000, LNCS; Springer-Verlag, 2000; 1807:539–556.
Okamoto T. Receipt-free electronic voting schemes for large scale elections. Proceedings of Workshop of Security Protocols’ 97, LNCS; Springer-Verlag, 1996; 1163: 125–132.
Okamoto T. An electronic voting scheme. Proceedings of IFIP’ 96; Advanced IT Tools, Chapman & Hall, 1996; 21–30.
Niemi V, Renvall A. How to prevent buying of votes in computer elections. Proceedings of ASIACRYPT’ 94, LNCS; Springer-Verlag, 1994; 917: 141–148.
Cramer R, Gennaro R, Schoenmakers B. A secure and optimally efficient multi-authority election scheme. Proceedings of EUROCRYPT’ 97, LNCS; Springer-Verlag, 1997; 1233: 103–118.
Goldwasser S., Micali S. Probabilistic encryption. Journal of Computer and System Sciences 1984; 28:270–299.
Canetti R, Dwork C, Naor M, Ostrovsky R. Deniable encryption. Proceedings of CRYPT0’ 97, LNCS; Springer-Verlag, 1997; 1294:90–104.
Rabin M. Transaction protection by beacons. Journal of Computer Systems Science 1983; 27(2):256–267.
Desmedt Y. Threshold cryptography. European Transactions on Telecommunications 1994; 22(6):449–457.
ElGamal T. A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 1985; IT-30(4):469–472.
Pedersen T. A threshold cryptosystem without a trusted party. Proceedings of EUROCRYPT’ 91, LNCS; Springer-Verlag, 1991; 547:522–526.
Diffie W., Helman M. New directions in cryptography. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 1976; 22(6):644–654.
Chaum D, Pedersen T. Wallet databases with observers. Proceedings of CRYPT0’ 92, LNCS; Springer-Verlag, 1993; 740:89–105.
Fiat A, Shamir A. How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems. Proceedings of CRYPT0’ 86, LNCS; Springer-Verlag, 1987; 263:186–194.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2001 IFIP International Federation for Information Processing
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Magkos, E., Burmester, M., Chrissikopoulos, V. (2001). Receipt-freeness in Large-scale Elections without Untappable Channels. In: Schmid, B., Stanoevska-Slabeva, K., Tschammer, V. (eds) Towards the E-Society. IFIP International Federation for Information Processing, vol 74. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-306-47009-8_50
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/0-306-47009-8_50
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-0-7923-7529-6
Online ISBN: 978-0-306-47009-7
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive