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Embodying the Mind and Representing the Body

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Abstract

Does the existence of body representations undermine the explanatory role of the body? Or do certain types of representation depend so closely upon the body that their involvement in a cognitive task implicates the body itself? In the introduction of this special issue we explore lines of tension and complement that might hold between the notions of embodiment and body representations, which remain too often neglected or obscure. To do so, we distinguish two conceptions of embodiment that either put weight on the explanatory role of the body itself or body representations. We further analyse how and to what extent body representations can be said to be embodied. Finally, we give an overview of the full volume articulated around foundational issues (How should we define the notion of embodiment? To what extent and in what sense is embodiment compatible with representationalism? To what extent and in what sense are sensorimotor approaches similar to behaviourism?) and their applications in several cognitive domains (perception, concepts, selfhood, social cognition).

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Notes

  1. Our use of the term “strong embodiment” is similar to that in Dempsey & Shani (forthcoming) article, though his central concern is with distinguishing strong embodiment (or “strong embodied cognitive science”) from the form of extended functionalism proposed by Clark (2008a, b) (see also Jacob, this volume). The term “strong embodiment” is also used in Chatterjee (2010) and Meteyard et al. (2012), but in a manner wholly divergent from both Dempsey & Shani’s and our own. In both Chatterjees and Meteyard et al.’s discussion, a “strongly embodied” view is committed to the claim that conceptual processing activates precisely the neural perceptual and motor structures that were engaged in the original perceptual and motor experiences involved in instances of the relevant concepts; views are “disembodied” or more “weakly embodied” to the extent that they depart from such a commitment. On our use of the strong/weak distinction (and likely, Shani’s), both Chatterjee and Meteyard et al.’s reviews limit their scope to weak embodiment.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Centre for Subjectivity Research (cfs.ku.dk), University of Copenhagen, Njalsgade 140-142, 2300, Copenhagen, Denmark

    Adrian John Tetteh Alsmith

  2. Institut Jean Nicod, CNRS–ENS–EHESS, 29 rue d’Ulm, 75005, Paris, France

    Frédérique de Vignemont

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  1. Adrian John Tetteh Alsmith
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  2. Frédérique de Vignemont
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Correspondence to Adrian John Tetteh Alsmith.

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This work was supported by a grant from the Volkswagen Foundation’s European Platform for Life Sciences, Mind Sciences & the Humanities (ref. 85 639).

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Alsmith, A.J.T., de Vignemont, F. Embodying the Mind and Representing the Body. Rev.Phil.Psych. 3, 1–13 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-012-0085-4

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