Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

From Volitionalism to the Dual Aspect Theory of Action

  • Published:
Philosophia Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Volitionalism is a theory of action motivated by certain shortcomings in the standard causal theory of action. However, volitionalism is vulnerable to the objection that it distorts the phenomenology of embodied agency. Arguments for volitionalism typically proceed by attempting to establish three claims: (1) that whenever an agent acts, she tries or wills to act, (2) that it is possible for volitions to occur even in the absence of bodily movement, and (3) that in cases of successful bodily actions the relation between volition and bodily movement is causal. I defend an argument for the second of these claims from an objection by Thor Grünbaum, but I show that several volitionalist arguments for the third are not compelling. I then argue that the dual aspect theory of action provides a better account of the relationship between an agent’s volition and the bodily movements she makes when she acts, insofar as it has the same advantages over the standard story as volitionalism without being open to the phenomenological objection. I also defend the dual aspect theory from an objection by A.D. Smith. Finally, I show why the dual aspect theory of action is a better alternative to volitionalism than the theory of action recently put forward by Adrian Haddock. In order to avoid the phenomenological objection Haddock suggests a disjunctive account of bodily movements. While disjunctivism should be taken seriously in the philosophy of action, on the dual aspect theory it is the category of volition, rather than bodily movement, that should receive a disjunctive analysis.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. In the remainder of this paper I will use “action” to refer to bodily actions. This is not to deny the reality or importance of purely mental actions, but my central topic here will be the relation between an agent’s act of will and the movements that her body makes in cases of bodily action. The topic will also be restricted to the actions of rational human agents. Non-human animals also perform actions, but this does not necessitate that the same account of agency will be applicable to both rational and non-rational animals.

  2. I’ll be using these terms interchangeably, though some theorists (e.g., Lowe 2000, 248; McCann 1975, 108) distinguish between trying and willing.

  3. Searle argues that there is also a gap between an agent’s beliefs and desires and her intentions, on the ground that, at least in non-pathological cases, beliefs and desires do not necessitate the formation of an intention. For a fuller description of this objection to the standard story, along with more on the role that volition might play in filling these causal gaps, see Zhu 2004, 248-55.

  4. For example, Bishop (1989), Velleman (1992), and Enç (2003), are sensitive to the first objection and think it is possible to overcome it while avoiding the postulation of volitions. I cannot delve further into their proposals here, but I think they are ultimately unsuccessful.

  5. I disagree with Grünbaum about this last point. He believes that given “standard assumptions about causality and explanation” Ubiquity and Absence entail volitionalism (2008, 68). My goal in §3 will be to show that the assumptions about causality that volitionalist arguments for Causation rely on are dubious.

  6. See also Morris 1988, 485-6.

  7. I believe Brewer has something similar in mind when he complains that on the volitionalist’s picture we have a mental event of willing causing a biomechanical event of bodily movement, but neither of these is essentially an “active bodily movement” (1993, 305).

  8. For a further development of this line of argument see O’Shaughnessy (1973) and Hornsby (1980, 37-8).

  9. For a more skeptical take on Ubiquity see Morris (1988, 475-6).

  10. Another argument for Absence is discussed by Hornsby (1980, 41) and Grünbaum (2008, 75-81).

  11. I think it is strange to call this sort of mental episode a form of trying at all, but I will continue to use Grünbaum’s terminology.

  12. While there is much debate over the correct theoretical account of the self-conscious availability of beliefs, there can be little doubt that the phenomenon itself exists. For recent work on the topic see Moran (2001), Bar-On (2005), Shah and Velleman (2005), and Finkelstein (2008).

  13. For this account of the relation between intention for the future and intention in action see Brandom (1998, 256-9). There are other ways of conceiving of the distinction. For example, McDowell (2011) refers to what I here call intention in action as the onset of an intention in action, and uses the term intention in action to refer to the entire activity of willing, which is what I call volition. As far as I can see this is merely a terminological difference. If one prefers this alternative terminology, then it will be true that intention can do the explanatory work I attribute to volition, but one can then re-formulate the question of this section by asking whether there can be a “naked” intention in action (and, more generally, one can understand this paper as inquiring into the nature of the relationship between intention in action and bodily movement).

  14. Grünbaum (2008, 70-1) mentions this argument and attributes it to O’Shaughnessy (1973).

  15. This example is especially relevant because my own view will be that the relation between volition and bodily movement in a case of successful action is similar to the one that holds between mitosis and the movement of chromosomes.

  16. In fact, he also makes the stronger claim that every physical action is identical with a bodily movement (1987, 102). I argue against the idea that actions are identical to bodily movements in §§4-5.

  17. Smith’s argument thus relies on Absence, since it assumes that one can try to move one’s body even if no appropriate bodily movements occur.

  18. Similar cases are discussed in Hornsby 2011.

  19. Michael Thompson has recently discussed this sort of teleological unity under the heading “naïve action explanation” (2008, 90-1).

  20. For recent accounts of teleological processes, see Stout 1996, ch. 3 and Enç 2003, 104-11.

  21. The idea of a non-represented teleological process provides an interpretation of O’Shaughnessy’s idea in the quoted paragraph above that “willing physically develops, in naturally appointed causal manner”.

  22. See pp. 2-3 above.

  23. Moreover, given that O’Shaughnessy identifies actions and tryings, Smith thinks O’Shaughnessy’s theory also has the implausible implication that being an action is an inessential property of events.

  24. This assumes that we can make sense of her dying as a process whose duration is brief enough to allow the thought experiment to make sense. One might reasonably question whether this is valid assumption, but I will let it stand for the sake of argument.

  25. Brewer (1993) defends a disjunctive account of willing. O’Brien (2007, 151-2) mentions the possibility of a disjunctive account of trying without endorsing it. Lowe (2000, 248) distinguishes trying from volition and seems sympathetic to a disjunctive account of the former while rejecting it for the latter.

  26. The bodily movements that occur in each case are not, of course, supposed to be of the same psychological type; but perhaps they should be theorized as belonging to the same explanatorily more basic physiological or biomechanical type.

  27. I am taking it that the infinitival phrase “her body to moveI”, which appears in (M), denotes an event of bodily movement. This is reasonable because (M) seems to be semantically equivalent to (M*) If S movesT her body, then S causes her bodily movementI.

  28. In other words, I think a better account of action will involve the idea of agent causation. Hornsby and Haddock are both pushed into distorting interpretations of (M) because they reject the notion of agent causation without argument. However, I think that they are far too quick to dismiss it. One of the most influential arguments against agent causation is to the claim that agents cause their actions (e.g., Davidson 1971, 52). But (M) does not commit us to the idea that agents cause an action (a bodily movementT) but that they cause their bodily movementsI. I do not mean here to rule out reductive analyses of agent causation in terms of event causation (cf. Bishop 1989; Velleman 1992). A reductionist about agent causation can still admit that (M) commits us to the existence of agent causation she will just add that it is reducible to event causation of a certain sort, whereas Hornsby and Haddock want to deny even this much.

  29. For a classic account of causal powers see Harré and Madden 1975.

  30. In §2 I argued that volition should be conceived of in terms of a present-directed and continuing assent to the performance of a certain type of action. Furthermore, I argued that this assent is present in a case of paralysis as well as in a case of successful action. This shows that there is something present in both cases that goes beyond mere wishing and may be classified as a volition. The point of the present paragraph is not to deny this but to claim that the category of volition so understood should itself be conceived of disjunctively.

  31. I would like to thank two anonymous referees for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

References

  • Armstrong, D. (1981). The nature of mind. Brighton: The Harvester Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bar-On, D. (2005). Speaking my mind: Expression and self-knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bishop, J. (1989). Natural agency: An essay on the causal theory of action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brandom, R. (1998). Making it explicit: Reasoning, representing, and discursive commitment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brewer, B. (1993). The integration of spatial vision and action. In N. Eilan, R. McCarthy, & B. Brewer (Eds.), Spatial representation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davidson, D (1963). Actions, reasons, and causes. In D. Davidson (Ed.), Essays on actions and events (pp. 3–20). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Davidson, D. (1971). Agency. In D. Davidson (Ed.), Essays on actions and events (pp. 43–62). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Davidson, D. (1987). Problems in the explanation of action. In Rationality in action (pp. 101–116). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004

  • Davis, L. H. (1979). Theory of action. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

    Google Scholar 

  • Enç, B. (2003). How we act: Causes, reasons, and intentions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Finkelstein, D. H. (2008). Expression and the inner. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frankfurt, H. G. (1978). The problem of action. American Philosophical Quarterly, 15(2), 157–162.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ginet, C. (1990). On action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Grice, P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In P. Cole & J. Morgan (Eds.), Syntax and Semantics, 3: Speech Acts. New York: Academic Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grünbaum, T. (2008). Trying and the arguments from total failure. Philosophia, 36, 67–86.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Haddock, A. (2005). At one with our actions but at two with our bodies: Hornsby’s account of action. Philosophical Explorations, 8(2), 157–172.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harré, R., & Madden, E. H. (1975). Causal powers: A theory of natural necessity. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hornsby, J. (1980). Actions. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hornsby, J. (2011). Actions in their circumstances. In A. Ford, J. Hornsby, & F. Stoutland (Eds.), Essays on Anscombe’s Intention. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kant, I. (1998). Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals. Trans. by M. Gregor. In M. Gregor (Ed.), The Cambridge edition of the works of Immanuel Kant: Practical philosophy (pp. 37–108). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lowe, E. J. (2000). An introduction to the philosophy of mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Lowe, E. J. (2008). Personal agency. In Personal agency (pp. 141–158). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Moran, R. (2001). Authority and estrangement: An essay on self-knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • McCann, H.J. (1974). Volition and basic action. In H.J. McCann (Ed.), The works of agency: On human action, will and freedom (pp. 75–93). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

  • McCann, H. J. (1975). Trying, paralysis, and volition. In H.J. McCann (Ed.), The works of agency: On human action, will and freedom (pp. 94–109). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

  • McCann, H. J. (1986). Intrinsic intentionality. In H.J. McCann (Ed.), The works of agency: On human action, will and freedom (pp 127–146). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

  • McDowell, J. (1982). Criteria, defeasibility, and knowledge. Proceedings of the British Academy, 68, 455–479.

    Google Scholar 

  • McDowell, J. (2011). What is the content of an intention in action? In M. de Gaynesford (Ed.), Agents and their actions. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • McGinn, C. (1982). The character of mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Morris, K. J. (1988). Actions and the body: Sartre vs. Hornsby. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 48(3), 473–488.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • O’Brien, L. (2007). Self-knowing agents. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • O’Shaughnessy, B. (1973). Trying (as the mental “pineal gland”). The Journal of Philosophy, 70(13), 365–386.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • O’Shaughnessy, B. (1980). The will: A dual aspect theory (Vol. 2). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • O’Shaughnessy, B. (2003). The epistemology of physical action. In J. Roessler & N. Eilan (Eds.), Agency and self-awareness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pietroski, P. M. (1998). Actions, adjuncts, and agency. Mind, 107(425), 73–111.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Prichard, H. A. (1945). Acting, willing, and desiring. In Moral obligation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1949.

  • Searle, J. (2001). Rationality in action. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sellars, W. (1976). Volitions re-affirmed. In M. Brand & D. Walton (Eds.), Action theory. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shah, N., & Velleman, J. D. (2005). Doxastic deliberation. Philosophical Review, 114(4), 497–534.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smith, A. D. (1988). Agency and the essence of actions. The Philosophical Quarterly, 38(153), 401–421.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stout, R. (1996). Things that happen because they should. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Thompson, M. (2008). Life and action: Elementary structures of practice and practical thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Velleman, J. D. (1992). What happens when someone acts? In The possibility of practical reason (pp. 123–133). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000.

  • Widerker, D. (1995). Libertarianism and Frankfurt’s attack on the principle of alternative possibilities. Philosophical Review, 104(2), 247–261.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zhu, J. (2004). Understanding volition. Philosophical Psychology, 17(2), 247–273.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of St. Thomas, Saint Paul, MN, USA

    Joshua Stuchlik

Authors
  1. Joshua Stuchlik
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Joshua Stuchlik.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Stuchlik, J. From Volitionalism to the Dual Aspect Theory of Action. Philosophia 41, 867–886 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9414-9

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Revised:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9414-9

Keywords

Search

Navigation