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A note on negativity bias and framing response asymmetry

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Abstract

An “unprocessed risk” is a collection of simple lotteries with a reduction-rule that describes the actual-payoff to the decision-maker as a function of realized lottery outcomes. Experiments reveal that the willingness to pay for unprocessed risks is consistently biased toward the payoff-level in the unprocessed representation. The “anchoring-to-frame” bias in cases of positive framing is significantly weaker than in cases of negative framing suggesting that rational “negativity bias” may reflect in asymmetric violations of rationality.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Business Administration, The College of Management, 7 Rabin Blvd., P.O. Box 9017, 75190, Rishon Lezion, Israel

    Doron Sonsino

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  1. Doron Sonsino
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Correspondence to Doron Sonsino.

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Sonsino, D. A note on negativity bias and framing response asymmetry. Theory Decis 71, 235–250 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-009-9168-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-009-9168-9

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