Abstract
Previous research suggests that positive and normative beliefs about economics are largely unrelated. Using questions from two national surveys, this study finds that: (a) the underlying determinants of positive and normative beliefs are strikingly similar; (b) education is by far the strongest overall determinant of both positive and normative beliefs; and (c) the variables known to push positive beliefs in the same direction as formal economic training—education, male gender, income growth, and job security—also push normative beliefs in the same direction. These results strongly suggest that the positive-normative connection has been underestimated.
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Caplan, B., Miller, S.C. Positive versus normative economics: what’s the connection? Evidence from the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy and the General Social Survey . Public Choice 150, 241–261 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9700-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9700-z