Abstract
This paper offers a conceptual framework which (re)integrates goal-directed control, motivational processes, and executive functions, and suggests a developmental pathway from situated action to higher level cognition. We first illustrate a basic computational (control-theoretic) model of goal-directed action that makes use of internal modeling. We then show that by adding the problem of selection among multiple action alternatives motivation enters the scene, and that the basic mechanisms of executive functions such as inhibition, the monitoring of progresses, and working memory, are required for this system to work. Further, we elaborate on the idea that the off-line re-enactment of anticipatory mechanisms used for action control gives rise to (embodied) mental simulations, and propose that thinking consists essentially in controlling mental simulations rather than directly controlling behavior and perceptions. We conclude by sketching an evolutionary perspective of this process, proposing that anticipation leveraged cognition, and by highlighting specific predictions of our model.
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Notes
As an example, when I decide to go 120 km/h with my car, my task consists of maintaining the speedometer around 120 km/h, and to do so I base my actions on perceptual feedback concerning the bar of the speedometer. In the formulation of Powers (1973), I therefore ‘control’ (in a technical sense) my inputs and not my outputs, and execute some action (e.g. accelerate) with the aim of keeping the speedometer bar (the controlled variable) constant.
Note that the distinctions internal/external and proximal/distal are orthogonal. For instance, I can achieve the distal intention of getting drunk (an internal effect). In our example, however, the distal effect is external.
Not only do abstract goals allow multiple realizations; in parallel, the same action can (be selected to) realize multiple goals at multiple levels of abstraction. Consider how many descriptions we can give of the same motor action of moving our hands quickly toward one another: clapping hands, expressing enthusiasm, show celebration, contribute to the election of a new President, contribute to peace-keeping, etc. As already mentioned, the same representational structure holds for observed goals, as well; see Fig. 1.
See the discussion in Friston (2005) of a related architectural scheme, described in Bayesian terms, in which modules operating at each level introduce constraints for higher level and lower level modules that can be described as priors and prediction errors, respectively, in Bayesian terms. This leads to generative models, whose organizing principle is the reduction of prediction error at all levels.
See Gardenfors (2004) for a discussion of how internal loops can generate hidden variables that explain causal mechanisms, and, for instance, help us perceive the forces behind events.
In this control scheme there is nothing like ‘pure perception’, but imagination is part of the perceptual process. This is due to the fact that the filter component fuses external feedback and internal predictions to obtain an estimated state (which can be perceptual or non perceptual). This operation is important for central cancellation and filtering and for providing stable perception in face of changing environment and moving agent. It is worth noting, however, that this slightly modifies the idea of ‘control of perception’, since one can use predicted inputs instead of actual inputs (if I drive with my eyes closed, I can only imagine the speedometer bar, and I control imagined, self-generated variables and not perceptions).
Although plans can be prepared in simulation and stored in working memory to steer action, there is no guarantee that during execution the same sequence of schemas will be used, since the contextual conditions can vary. For example, I can plan grasping an object with my left hand, and then grasp it with my right hand if it is not longer in reach of left hand. At the same time, simulations can be quite abstract and involve effector-independent representations. Anyway, in this model planning always influence action execution since re-enacts schemas and primes them and their stimuli dimensions.
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This work was supported by the European Community, project HUMANOBS: Humanoids That Learn Socio-Communicative Skills Through Observation (FP7-231453). The authors would like to thank Michael Arbib, Anna Borghi, and Elisabeth Pacherie for useful comments and criticisms.
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Pezzulo, G., Castelfranchi, C. Thinking as the control of imagination: a conceptual framework for goal-directed systems. Psychological Research 73, 559–577 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-009-0237-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-009-0237-z