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Partnership, Solidarity, and Minimal Envy in Matching Problems

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Social Ethics and Normative Economics

Part of the book series: Studies in Choice and Welfare ((WELFARE))

Abstract

Consider a firm that has several factories. The firm must assign workers to these factories. Each factorymanager has preferences over the workers, while each worker has preferences over which factory he works at. What is a desirable rule to match workers to factories?

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, Kunitachi, Tokyo, 186-8601, Japan

    Koichi Tadenuma

Authors
  1. Koichi Tadenuma
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Correspondence to Koichi Tadenuma .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. , CERSES, University Paris Descartes, rue des Saints-Pères 45, Paris, 75006, France

    Marc Fleurbaey

  2. , CREM, UMR-CNRS 6211, University of Caen, rue Claude Bloch 17, Caen Cedex, 14032, France

    Maurice Salles

  3. , Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, Vanderbilt Place 2301, Nashville, 37215-1819, Tennessee, USA

    John A. Weymark

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Tadenuma, K. (2011). Partnership, Solidarity, and Minimal Envy in Matching Problems. In: Fleurbaey, M., Salles, M., Weymark, J. (eds) Social Ethics and Normative Economics. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17807-8_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17807-8_6

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-17806-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-17807-8

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