Abstract
We investigate the effect of decimalization on the aftermarket trading of NYSE-listed IPOs. We find that the relation between bid–ask spread and underpricing becomes negative post-decimalization, suggesting that benefits from the increased price competition accrue more to hot IPOs. The quoted depth is generally smaller post-decimalization due to a higher probability of front running, which aggravates the cost of adverse selection and limit order submission. We show that underwriters continue to provide price support but are only willing to cover the initial short position, if profitable to do so. Decimal pricing does not affect the flipping strategy of institutions for cold IPOs as they are likely bound by the underwriter’s price support and their share allocation. Institutions, however, tend to flip more hot IPOs during the post- than in the pre-decimalization period, suggesting that the cost of flipping is lower for shares with a substantial price run-up during aftermarket trading.
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Notes
NYSE and AMEX implemented decimal pricing initially with a small number of stocks on August 28, September 25, and December 4, 2000, and finally with the remaining stocks on January 29, 2001. NASDAQ, however, experimented with decimal pricing in March 2001 and went to full implementation in April 9, 2001.
We refer aftermarket trading as the first-day trading of post-IPO throughout this study. All NYSE-listed IPOs in our sample switched to decimal pricing in 2001.
Flipping refers to the activity of selling shares immediately after an IPO begins trading in the aftermarket.
Corwin and Harris (2001) find that smaller and riskier firms tend to list on NASDAQ to avoid the higher listing fees on the NYSE. The aggregating demand feature of the NYSE suggests that their IPOs have lower underpricing and narrower spreads than IPOs that trade on NASDAQ [see Bennouri et al. (2012)]. Importantly, the underwriter typically becomes the market maker of NASDAQ-listed IPOs, but NYSE Rule 98 requires an organizational separation between the underwriter and the specialist.
Using the Standard and Poors Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) code at the ten-industry sector level, about 28 % of the firms are classified in the information technology industry on the NASDAQ, whereas only 7 % of the firms are in this industry on the NYSE.
Ritter and Welch (2002) document that the percentage of technology IPOs dropped from 72 % (803 IPOs) during the internet bubble in 1999–2000 to 29 % (80 IPOs) in 2001.
We conduct an analysis on the impact of tick size reduction from $1/8 to $1/16 on the spreads of NYSE-listed IPOs from January 1, 1996 to December 31, 1998. Our results (not reported but available upon request) show that the spreads decline significantly for hot, warm, and cold IPOs after the reduction. However, we do not find any evidence that suggests a relation between spreads and underpricing for tick size changes on June 24, 1997. We thank the referee for suggesting the test for the tick size reduction for NYSE-listed IPOs on June 24, 1997.
Overallotment options are also known as Green Shoe options. Normally, the issuer allows the underwriter to offer shares up to 115 % with an over-allotment options agreement which allows the underwriter to buy additional shares from the issuer within 30-days. In our sample, 226 out of 230 NYSE-listed IPOs have the overallotment options agreement with underwriters.
Chen and Ritter (2000) document a seven percent rule of the underwriter spread. Thus, it is obvious that short-covering from a market purchase is profitable if the share price drops more than seven percent below the offering price, regardless of pre- or post-decimalization.
We also use other classifications for hot, warm, and cold IPOs employed by previous studies for our robustness checks. Overall, the results do not change materially.
Consistent with the argument of underwriter price stabilization in cold IPOs, 25 out of the 29 and 22 out of the 28 cold IPOs open at exactly the offering price in the pre- and post-decimalization periods, respectively.
IPOs are assigned the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) code at the ten-industry sector level.
Assigning trades completed at prices above (below) the prevailing quote midpoint as customer buys (sells). Trades executed at the quote midpoint are assigned by the “tick test”, in which trades at a higher (lower) price as compared to the most recent trade at a different price are classified as buys (sells).
The Wilcoxon signed ranks tests (not reported but available upon request) show that the medians of both quoted dollar spread and effective dollar spread for hot IPOs are higher than cold IPOs, and statistically significant at 1 % in pre-decimalization. However, the medians are not significantly different between hot and cold IPOs in post-decimalization. This result supports our findings later that hot IPOs receive greater spread reductions after decimalization.
For added robustness, we perform a similar analysis on the median depths and spreads. The results are qualitatively similar but not reported.
Boehmer and Fishe (2004b) document that the underwriter generally submits passive buy orders to provide liquidity.
Campbell et al. (2004) note that institutions might break trades into extremely small sizes when they are stealth trading, or institutions are likely to engage in scrum trades to round off an extremely small equity position, and institutions may put in tiny iceberg trades to test the waters before trading in a larger size. Aggarwal (2003) documents that institutions split their orders into smaller sizes in order to reduce the price impact.
Krigman et al. (1999) find that institutional flipping accounts for 45 and 22 % of the total dollar volume of cold and hot IPOs, respectively.
To investigate the selling pressure of cold IPOs post-decimalization, we collect the overallotment options (green shoe options) data for cold IPOs from the SDC database, and find that overallotment shares increase in price post-decimalization but the results are not statistically significant. However, the overallotment shares remain relatively the same for both hot and warm IPOs, pre- and post-decimalization. The results are not reported but available upon request. Ellis et al. (2000, 2002) document that the quality of overallotment exercise data provided by the SDC is a concern. Thus, we are unable to examine whether the overallotment options are exercised more for hot, warm or cold IPOs. However, in general, underwriters receive about 22 % (20 %) of green shoe options for hot (cold) IPOs in both the pre- and post-decimalization periods. We thank the referee for pointing out this issue.
The mean and median of the first day total trading volume for hot (cold) IPOs are 12.64 (9.65) and 8.60 (7.18) million, respectively, in our sample.
The mean values of shares traded as a proportion of total shares offered on the first trading day are 62.07 and 64.77 % in the pre- and post-decimalization periods, respectively. Aggarwal (2003) reports that the mean of the shares traded as a proportion of total shares offered in the first two days is 81.97 %. Thus, we eliminate outliers which are defined as shares traded on the first day that are more than 100 % of the total shares offered. 5 (8 %) and 4 (7 %) IPOs are deleted in pre- and post-decimalization, respectively, from the sample.
To control for the possible effect from the quoting environment (e.g., different tick size) on the underpricing, we adjust the underpricing by regressing the underpricing variable on the a variable of decimalization for hot, warm, and cold IPOs. The results remain unchanged for all models.
Control firms are selected based on (1) non-IPO firms; (2) NYSE; (3) same 2-digit SIC; and (4) similar market capitalization, closing price times shares outstanding, prior to IPO listing day to IPO opening price times shares outstanding. Thus, 230 seasoned stocks are selected as control firms.
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Charoenwong, C., Ding, D.K. & Thong, T.Y. Decimalization, IPO aftermath, and liquidity. Rev Quant Finan Acc 47, 1303–1344 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-015-0539-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-015-0539-8