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Soul-making theodicy and compatibilism: new problems and a new interpretation

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Abstract

In the elaboration of his soul-making theodicy, John Hick agrees with a controversial point made by compatibilists Antony Flew and John Mackie against the free will defense. Namely, Hick grants that God could have created humans such that they would be free to sin but would, in fact, never do so. In this paper, I identify three previously unrecognized problems that arise from his initial concession to, and ultimate rejection of, compatibilism. The first problem stems from the fact that in two important texts, Hick rejects compatibilism (after having endorsed it as effective against the free will defense) for different and seemingly contradictory reasons. His various explanations of soul-making theodicy’s relationship to compatibilism are therefore in conflict. The second problem is closely related to the first. It turns out that when Hick’s concession to compatibilism is closely examined, soul-making theodicy appears unable to explain the existence of moral evil. The final problem consists in understanding why Hick would have made any concessions to compatibilism in the first place given that he ultimately opts for incompatibilist free will. After identifying these three problems, I develop a distinctive way in which to interpret Hick’s soul-making theodicy that solves the first two. This distinctive interpretation, moreover, has the added benefit of solving another, well-recognized problem that has long plagued Hick’s exposition: the problem of the hypnotist metaphor. Finally, I address the third problem by suggesting a rationale for Hick’s initial concession to the compatibilists.

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Notes

  1. Alvin Plantinga’s presentation of his free will defense is in Plantinga (1977). One may also consult Plantinga (1974). Antony Flew’s criticism of the free will defense can be found in Flew (1955, pp. 144–169). For Mackie’s classic objection, see Mackie (1955).

  2. See also Hick (2010, p. 267). The book in which Hick’s quotation above appears has been reissued in a new edition. Hick’s explanation of his theodicy in this new edition is very little changed from that in the original. Moreover, the commentators’ primary focus in the new edition is on issues not relevant to this paper, while their focus in the original edition is. I will thus appeal to the original edition. For the updated edition, see Davis (2001).

  3. Technically, Hick calls the type of free will he has in mind “Freedom as Limited Creativity” (Hick 2010, pp. 275–277). As the best explanation of this concept, he cites chap. 9 of Campbell (1957). It is clear (and universally conceded) that Hick has in mind a particular sort of incompatibilist freedom. For example, Hick writes that “I shall in fact argue at a later stage that the Christian conception of the divine purpose for man requires as its postulate the stronger notion of free will [than that offered by Flew] as a capacity for choice whose outcome is in principle unpredictable” (Hick 2010, p. 268, italics mine). Michael Martin calls the freedom Hick employs “contracausal freedom” (Martin 1990, pp. 432–434). For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to this as a form of “libertarian” freedom so as to distinguish it from compatibilist understandings of freedom. This usage is not meant to imply that an agent free in this sense is free to do any action whatsoever, such as curse God to God’s face. (Indeed, Hick denies exactly this.) Nor should this usage be taken to endorse any position in the debate over the correct understanding of libertarianism. For discussions of the latter, see Clarke (2003) and Widerker and McKenna (2002).

  4. For example, see Martin (1990, p. 433) and Griffin (1976, pp. 174–196).

  5. The necessity of natural evil will not be at issue in this paper. My ultimate claim that SMT, along with Hick’s concessions to the compatibilists, should rule out moral evil does not necessarily extend to natural evil. The arguments by which SMT claims the necessity of natural evil may not be susceptible to the same arguments I make against its claim of moral evil’s possibility. Indeed, one of advantages typically claimed on behalf of SMT is that it purportedly better explains natural evils than does the free will defense.

  6. Indeed, one could interpret many stories in the Bible as examples of cases where people know and love God and yet fail morally.

  7. For similar statements, see the following: Martin (1990, pp. 430–433), Griffin (1976, p. 193), Geivett (1993, p. 195) and Rowe (1991, pp. 114–117).

  8. For an objection to this particular claim, see Ward (1969). Hick replies in Hick (1970).

  9. For a persuasive, recent denial of this claim, see Trakakis (2007). For a nice discussion of how Hick’s emphasis on epistemic distance is related to Anselm’s claim that the angels needed to be created with a degree of ignorance in order to be self-determined, see Adams (2010).

  10. As we will see later, however, Hick denies the necessity of evil for epistemic distance.

  11. The first edition was published in 1966. In this paper, I reference the second edition (Hick 2010) since, as will become clear, the latter includes important responses to objections.

  12. This concept was first introduced by Flew (1955, pp. 161ff).

  13. Hick’s discussion is somewhat imprecise in that it conflates L1 and L2. As the quotation makes clear, however, his focus is on the need to reject compatibilist freedom so as to achieve L1. It is further worth noting that this passage famously contains an apparent equivocation with regard to freedom. We will return to this quotation later and propose a solution to this longstanding problem.

  14. See Kane (1975a) and Kane (1975b). Hick addresses all five of Kane’s objections in the second edition of EGL (Hick 2010) and refers readers to chapter 13 of his Death and Eternal Life for a response to the sixth (see Hick 1976).

  15. It might be thought that the law-like nature of the universe “necessarily brings about pain and suffering for sentient beings who inhabit the world” (Kane 1975a, p. 6). If so, then evil would be a necessary by-product of epistemic distance resulting from the law-like nature of the world, and Kane’s objection would fail. It is worth noting that Kane proceeds to address this issue by using Hick’s owns words. The details of Kane’s response to this issue are not relevant since, as we will soon see, Hick grants Kane’s initial objection.

  16. “Some forms of environmental challenge and danger are needed if the world is to function as a place of person-making for morally and spiritually immature creatures” (Hick 2010, p. 380).

  17. Geivett makes a similar point when he wonders why God could “not have so constituted human beings that they would always freely act uprightly toward one another and yet also guarantee their freedom to respond to God” (Geivett 1993, p. 160).

  18. This need not necessarily mean that he thinks compatibilist freedom is sufficient for L1 in AIT. His discussion of L1 in AIT is carried out in abstraction from any discussion of types of freedom. The main point is that his rejection of compatibilist freedom in EGL is based upon its insufficiency for L1 while, in AIT, its rejection is based upon its insufficiency for L2.

  19. One might wonder why virtues cannot be ‘hard won’ through a compatibilist struggle against evil and temptation. I consider this objection below in the context of Ninian Smart’s argument.

  20. It should be noted that Hick does refer to the idea of HWVs in EGL. He writes “One who has attained to goodness by meeting and eventually mastering temptations, and thus by rightly making responsible choices in concrete situations, is good in a richer and more valuable sense than would be one created ab initio in a state either of innocence or of virtue” (Hick 2010, p. 255). The relevant point, however, is that the need to acquire such HWVs is not his reason for rejecting compatibilist freedom in EGL. Indeed, it is merely seventeen pages later in EGL when he grants the compatibilist challenge with regard to L2 and instead rejects it on the basis of L1. It is not until AIT that his rejection of compatibilist freedom rests squarely on the need to acquire HWVs.

  21. Note that this state of affairs would not necessarily rule out a libertarian freedom with regard to achieving L1. In this way, Hick’s initial rejection of compatibilism with regard to L1 in EGL could remain.

  22. “… but it need not be assumed that the various particular moral qualities which relate to man’s pilgrimage through time continue as such into eternity” (Hick 2010, p. 382).

  23. See also Feinberg (2004, pp. 147–149).

  24. Smart’s argument is made in Smart (1961).

  25. The responses to Smart can be found in Flew (1962) and Mackie (1962).

  26. Preceding the quotation above, Hick writes “And Smart’s reasoning does not exclude this idea. It remains as a possibility;” where “idea” refers to the Flew–Mackie reply to Smart. The context makes clear that Hick is endorsing the Flew–Mackie response to Smart.

  27. For a sampling, see the following: Griffin (1976, p. 195); Griffin’s critique in Hick (1981, pp. 54–55), Feinberg (2004, p. 153), Martin (1990, pp. 432–434), Mesle (1991, pp. 23–27) and Fulmer (1982, p. 175).

  28. Hick’s explanation of SMT in AIT is followed by critiques from the other contributors to the volume, one of whom is David Ray Griffin. Hick then proceeds to respond to those critiques.

  29. “is a deity who would do all this [i.e. allow Hiroshimas and Auschwitzes], solely for the sake of knowing that some of its creatures came to love their creator freely, ‘limitlessly good?’ Again, Hick has not made this plausible” (Griffin 1981, pp. 54–55). Griffin does not, as we have done in this paper, explain how moral evil arises from L1 ultimately as a result of L2 collapsing into L1.

  30. “(I find it hard to take seriously Griffin’s suggestion that God’s purpose in creation might be satisfied by giving us the mere illusion rather than the reality of freedom …),” (Hick 1981, p. 65).

  31. Of course, this does not imply that John plays no role in Jane’s love for him. Given that John exhibits some qualities of character that Jane finds attractive, John could be considered to some degree a source for Jane’s love. Despite this, however, John is not the ultimate source of Jane’s love in the way a hypnotist or God would be the ultimate source of the received love.

  32. I am not asserting that this is ultimately a successful or non-problematic criterion of freedom. My only point is that if we assume this is a criterion Hick has in mind, he can at least be absolved from an equivocation on freedom in the hypnotist passage. My goal has been to discover a way in which Hick may be read as not being contradictory. As it turns out, this way of understanding his criterion of freedom not only absolves him from a blatant contradiction and reliance upon a suspect noetic criterion (which he denies), but also helps resolve P1 and P2.

  33. It is possible to advocate a theodicy with elements similar to SMT without assuming it leads to universalism. See, for example, Swinburne (2011, p. 257), Stump (1985) and Timpe (2014).

  34. It is outside the scope of this paper to fully delve into this issue. The interested reader is referred to ch. 16 of Hick (2010, pp. 337–364), Hick (1981, pp. 51–52, 66–67), Hick (1976, pp. 242–261), and Hick (1973, p. 525). A way of putting his argument for universalism in terms used in this paper is the following. Recall that according to SMT, we humans are not initially created in the likeness of God. Instead, we are created susceptible to moral evil so that we have the opportunity to acquire HWVs on our own. This enables us to enter into a relationship with God better than that which would have resulted from God initially creating us in God’s likeness. But the susceptibility to moral evils that this marginally better relationship with God requires hardly seems justified if not all persons eventually attain this better relationship.

  35. Non-theists may object to the reasoning above that the present moral evils are not justified by the possibility of this marginally better relationship even if all persons do eventually attain it.

  36. Among the most prominent critiques are the following: Kane (1975b), Ward (1969) and Rist (1972). See also Geivett (1993, pp. 188–204).

  37. Again, Hick writes “Any usable notion of human freedom must be compatible with our having been created with the nature that we actually have” (Hick 1976, p. 256). See also Hick (1973, 526–527).

  38. To see this, consider Hick’s psychiatrist metaphor in his response to critics. While most therapists are not the source of their patients’ built-in characters, the case with God is different. Any acts of choosing and loving God that would follow from any “operations of divine grace” analogous to electric-shock treatments would therefore violate the source-recipient non-identity criterion. As a result, those actions could not even qualify as compatibly free acts (if we are to take Hick’s comments on the hypnotist illustration as normative). Much less could they be characterized by libertarian freedom.

  39. In the context of EGL, Hick brings up “Freedom as Limited Creativity” specifically as a “conception of man’s freedom vis-à-vis God.” In other words, it is invoked purely in reference to L1 in abstraction from L2. This fact need not pose a problem, however. In trying to defend Hick, we can presume that such freedom, if coherent, would govern our actions toward fellow human beings too and thus be involved in the acquisition of HWVs. Hick himself seems to presume as much in his presentation of SMT.

  40. According to Hick, C. A. Campbell best defends this account of freedom in ch. 9 of Campbell (1957). The reader is free (?) to decide whether Campbell’s defense is any more illuminating. See also Martin (1990, p. 433).

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Acknowledgements

Special thanks to Marilyn McCord Adams, Michael V. Dougherty, Brendan Doyle, and members of the University of Buffalo Philosophy Department who attended a presentation of an earlier draft at the University Regent’s Lecture. A generous summer research grant from Niagara University helped make this paper possible.

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Barnwell, M. Soul-making theodicy and compatibilism: new problems and a new interpretation. Int J Philos Relig 82, 29–46 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-017-9617-2

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