Abstract
The ambiguity in allocating economic stages to regulatory stages that arises in some contexts does not prevent either antitrust or regulatory intervention with respect to content and distribution. However, the feasibility of intervening with respect to vertical integration does not by itself make such intervention wise. In general, cases when a dominant distributor over substantial areas tries to integrate with an established content provider that dominates its programming segment, antitrust intervention on potential competition grounds may be warranted. This rationale does not justify an outright ban on ISP investment in content, but such a ban would not stop rapid development of web content and might be worth it if it prevents limitations on ISP pricing flexibility.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Chipty T. (2001) Vertical integration, market foreclosure, and consumer welfare in the cable television industry. American Economic Review 91(3): 428–453
Farrell P., Weiser J. (2003) Modularity, vertical integration, and open access policies: Towards a convergence of antitrust and regulation in the internet age. Harvard Journal Law Technology 17(1): 85–135
Hart, O., & Tirole, J. (1990). Vertical integration and market foreclosure. Brookings papers—microeconomics, 205–286.
Ordover J. A., Saloner G., Salop S. C. (1990) Equilibrium vertical foreclosure. American Economic Review 80(1): 127–142
Salinger M. (1988) Vertical mergers and market foreclosure. Quarterly Journal Economics 103(2): 345–356
Salinger M. (1991) Vertical mergers in multi-product industries and edgeworth’s paradox of taxation. Journal Industrial Economics 40(5): 545–556
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Salinger, M. Discussion of Papers by Bruce Owen and Christopher Yoo. Rev Ind Organ 38, 435–440 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-011-9292-x
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-011-9292-x