Abstract
Baldenius and Meng (Rev Account Stud, 2010) use a signaling model to study the economic effects of active investors to whom the founder of a firm wants to sell shares. This discussion considers the model structure, the main results and the economics behind them, and the key assumptions that drive these results. It also comments on signaling models in general, the use of additional signals, and the ability of the results to derive predictions.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Baldenius, T., & Meng, X. (2010). Signaling firm value to active investors. Review of Accounting Studies doi:10.1007/s11142-010-9130-7.
Cho, I.-K., & Kreps, D. (1987). Signaling games and stable equilibria. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, 179–222.
Fan, Q. (2007). Earnings management and ownership retention for initial public offering firms: Theory and evidence. The Accounting Review, 82, 27–64.
Leland, H., & Pyle, D. (1977). Informational asymmetries, financial structure, and financial intermediation. Journal of Finance, 32, 371–387.
Postrel, S. (1991). Burning your britches behind you: Can policy scholars bank on game theory? Strategic Management Journal, 12(2), 153–155.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Wagenhofer, A. Discussion of “Signaling firm value to active investors”. Rev Account Stud 15, 620–628 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-010-9123-6
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-010-9123-6