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The Underdetermination of Theories and Scientific Realism

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Abstract

The empirical underdetermination of theories is a philosophical problem which until the last century has not seriously troubled actual science. The reason is that confirmation does not depend only on empirical consequences, and theoretical virtues allow to choose among empirically equivalent theories. Moreover, I argue that the theories selected in this way are not just pragmatically or aesthetically better, but more probably (and/or largely) true. At present in quantum mechanics not even theoretical virtues allow to choose among many competing theories and interpretations, but this is because none of them possess those virtues to a sufficient degree. However, first, we can hope for some future advancement (new empirical tests, or new theories). Second, even if no further progress came forth, all the most credited competitors agree on a substantial core of theoretical assumptions. Therefore underdetermination does not show that we cannot be realist on unobservable entities in general, but at most that in particular fields our inquiry may encounter some de facto limits.

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Notes

  1. Psillos (1999: 168). Here of course the stress in on ‘non trivial and minimally plausible’.

  2. Stanford (2009a); see also Kitcher (1993, 154); Leplin (1997) and Achinstein (2002).

  3. Stanford (2006). There is no room in this article for a discussion Stanford’s specific version of underdetermination, which will be matter of a subsequent paper.

  4. See e.g. Bacciagaluppi (2012), Barrett (2014), Dieks (2017 §§ 3–5), Faye (2014), Ghirardi (2016), Goldstein (2017), Laudisa and Rovelli (2008), Lombardi and Dieks (2017), Myrvold (2016) and Vaidman (2014).

  5. I owe this suggestion to Dennis Dieks. See Dieks et al. (2015).

  6. See also Laudan (1996, ch. 3), Psillos (1999, 169–176).

  7. In a similar way, Laudan and Leplin (1991, 461–462) argue that if a theory T entails two logically independent theoretical hypotheses H1 and H2, and if in turn these hypotheses entail the classes of observational consequences E1 and E2, respectively, then the truth of any member of E1 will support H1 and also H2, even though H2 does not entail any statement in E1. Against this argument Samir Okasha (1997) raises a problem already noticed by Hempel (1945, 103–104): the argument assumes the principle of abductive support (AS): “any statement (abductively) supports any statement by which it is entailed”. It is thanks to (AS) that E1 supports H1 and H1 supports T (which in turn supports H2). But (AS) has the absurd consequence that every statement confirms any other one. In fact, take any couple of arbitrary statements P and Q. By (AS) P confirms (P&Q) since (P&Q) entails P. But (P&Q) confirms Q, because it entails it. So, by transitivity P confirms Q. Therefore (AS) must be rejected, and with it Laudan and Leplin’s argument (Okasha 1997, 253). Now, why (AS) doesn’t work is clear already from Occam’s razor: any evidence supports only the hypotheses which is strictly needed to explain it, to the exclusion of any redundant hypothesis. Equally, therefore, (AS) must be rephrased as (AS’): “Any statement supports any statement which is strictly needed to entail it, to the exclusion of any redundancy”. Now, (AS’) blocks the derivation of Q from P (because (P&Q) is not strictly needed to entail P, since P itself is enough); yet, (AS’) is enough to show that there may be some evidence E1 which supports H2 even if it is not entailed by it, as argued by Laudan and Leplin. On this issue see also Acuña and Dieks (2014, § 4.2.2).

  8. That little or no support comes from ad hoc consequences has been argued by Popperians, and that strong confirmation comes from novel predictions is argued in Alai 2014b.

  9. As shown in the literature, a phenomenon counts as novel even if it was known beforehand, but the theorist didn’t use it in building the theory that predicts it (Alai 2014b).

  10. For instance Boyd (1973: 7–8) holds that Poincaré’s theory of Euclidean space plus distorting forces is less plausible than its rival because such distorting forces, which are not generated by matter or by motion, are unlike any forces we know of.

  11. For instance, Acuña and Dieks (2014, § 6) notice that although Lorentz’ electron theory was EE to Einstein’s relativity theory, it was abandoned as quantum mechanics became accepted, around 1911, because it was incompatible with it.

  12. Fano (2005: 166) and Psillos (1999, p. 163).

  13. E.g., see Dieks (2017: 302).

  14. See ibid:308.

  15. Stanford (2009a), footnote 9, lists a number of works discussing the question of when, and to what extent, empirically equivalent theories can be considered just different formulations of one and the same theory: Glymour (1970, 1977, 1980, 2013) Sklar (1982) and Halvorson (2012, 2013).

  16. Cfr. Newton-Smith (1978). Psillos (1999, 169) holds that this cannot be the only and whole realist answer to empirical underdetermination. But it can be one partial answer.

  17. See also Grandy (1973) and Stich (1991, ch 2).

  18. See also Dorato (2007: 196).

  19. Problems have been raised with his argument, but now we have an even better grasp of the truth-conducivity of inductive methods.

  20. See Lipton (1991, Ch. 9).

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Acknowledgements

I thank Alberto Cordero, Dennis Dieks, Vincenzo Fano, Michel Ghins, Flavia Marcacci, Gino Tarozzi, and two referees for many of illuminating comments and helpful suggestions.

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    Mario Alai

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Alai, M. The Underdetermination of Theories and Scientific Realism. Axiomathes 29, 621–637 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-018-9384-4

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