¹ See, e.g., Hunter, Floyd, Community Power Structure (Chapel Hill, 1953)Google Scholar; and Dahl, Robert A., Who Governs? (New Haven, 1961)Google Scholar.

² Bachrach, Peter and Baratz, Morton S., “Two Faces of Power,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 56 (12 1962), pp. 947–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar. A somewhat similar view, arrived at independently, may be found in Anton, Thomas J., “Power, Pluralism, and Local Politics,” Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 7 (03 1963), p. 453CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ See Bachrach and Baratz, op. cit., pp. 947, 952.

⁴ Cf. Rossi, Peter, “Community Decision-Making,” in Young, Roland (ed.), Approaches to the Study of Politics (Evanston, Ill., 1958), p. 359Google Scholar.

⁵ Hobbes, Thomas, as paraphrased by Friedrich, C. J., Constitutional Government and Politics (New York, 1937), p. 12Google Scholar.

⁶ Lasswell, Harold D. and Kaplan, Abraham, Power and Society (New Haven, 1950), p. 75Google Scholar, draw this implication from the definition of power, i.e., “the production of intended effects,” in Russell, Bertrand, Power: A New Social Analysis (New York, 1938), p. 35Google Scholar.

⁷ Lasswell and Kaplan, loc. cit.

⁸ Agreement based upon reason represents another kind of interpersonal relationship—authority—which is discussed below.

⁹ It might be argued that the “victim” did not actually exercise power in this instance, because he had no sanctions with which to threaten the sentry. This objection misses the obvious point: the “victim” threatened the guard with severe deprivations (dishonor, imprisonment) if the guard did not perform his soldierly duty by complying with the “victim's” command that he (the “victim”) be killed.

¹⁰ See part IV below.

¹¹ See part II below.

¹² Lasswell and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 76. We have deleted “actual or” from the parenthetical expression because actual deprivation for nonconformity is a property of force, rather than power. This point is discussed further below.

The Lasswell-Kaplan definition is open to another criticism. They observe (p. 77) that “to have power is to be taken into account in others' acts (policies).” Strictly construed, this must mean that any and every person or group involved—in whatever degree—in decision-making must have power. For is not the farmer who markets .001 percent of the total supply of wheat “taken into account” by other buyers and sellers in just the same sense—though not, of course, in the same degree—as is the General Motors Corporation in the determination of automobile prices? Or, to change the illustration, is it not the case that, in the literal interpretation of the word, nonvoters as well as voters “participate,” and therefore have power, in deciding close elections? We should think so. But if this is what is meant by power, how can we avoid concluding that no matter where we look, we shall always find that power is broadly diffused? To rephrase, if (a) we analyze the distribution of power solely in terms of decision-making and (b) we ascribe power to all who participate in whatever measure or with whatever “weight” (“The weight of power is the degree of participation in the making of decisions …” [Ibid.], then (c) do we not necessarily prejudge that power in real-world situations will be widely dispersed? For further discussion of this general question, see Bacharach and Baratz, op. cit.

¹³ See part III below.

¹⁴ See Neustadt, Richard E., Presidential Power (New York, 1960), p. 21Google Scholar. Compare Schelling, Thomas C., The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), pp. 38–9Google Scholar.

¹⁵ This error, compounded by that of regarding power as something which is possessed, may well have underlain the policy of the United States toward Chiang Kai-Shek during the period (1944–49) of the Chinese civil war. It is entirely possible, that is to say, that in providing substantial amounts of armament to the Kuomintang regime, we mistook the instruments of power for power itself; and, in addition, by interpreting the Kuomintang-Communist struggle in terms of our own values, we utterly misread the temper of the great majority of the Chinese people.

The abortive invasion of Cuba in April 1961 is perhaps another example of the inherent dangers in projecting our values onto a populace holding a different collection of interests. Looking at the great body of Cuban nationals who were apparently bereft both of individual freedom and personal dignity, we concluded that we need only provide the opportunity, the spark, which would ignite nationwide uprisings against the Castro regime. But hindsight has indicated how badly we misread popular feeling in Cuba. See Alsop, Stewart, “Lessons of the Cuban Disaster,” Saturday Evening Post, 24 06 1961, pp. 26–27Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Neustadt, op. cit., pp. 12–13. On the general point, see also Schelling, op. cit., p. 6.

¹⁷ The point is also well illustrated by Franco-American policy differences in the early 1960s. Committed both to the defense of Western Europe and to strict limitation on the number of nations with independent nuclear forces, the United States was caught in a dilemma in its dealings with General de Gaulle. In the words of a contemporary observer, “De Gaulle … has played a judo trick on the United States … [He] means to fashion his ‘European construction,’ based on the force de frappe and the Franco-German axis and excluding the British and Americans. And he means to do this under the umbrella of the American nuclear deterrent … there is precious little the Kennedy Administration can do about de Gaulle's judo trick—short of removing its nuclear protection. And this has not even been seriously considered. … ‘We're a bit like that little Dutch boy with his finger in the dike,’ says one Kennedy adviser. Remove the American commitment to defend Europe, and the result is unmitigated disaster, not only to Europe but to the United States. Thus the United States, like the little Dutch boy, is immobilized. The strongest power in the Western alliance has amazingly little bargaining power in the alliance.” Alsop, Stuart, “Should We Pull Out of Europe?” Saturaday Evening Post, 13 04 1963, p. 80Google Scholar. Emphasis in original.

The main point is made more pithily by “President Hudson” in Drury's, Allen novel, A Shade of Difference (New York, 1962), p. 82Google Scholar: “The more real power you have, the less you can afford to exercise it, and the less real power you have, the more you can throw it around.”

For further discussion of the relationship between power and commitment, see Abramson, E.et al., “Social Power and Commitment Theory,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 23 (02 1958), pp. 15–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁸ With Lasswell and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 16, we define a value as “a desired event—a goal event. That X values Y means that X acts so as to bring about the consummation of Y.”

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 76.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 77.

²¹ Op. cit., pp. 17–18. A corollary proposition could be called the “rule of misanticipated reactions.” We refer to a situation in which one person grudgingly conforms to what he thinks another wants, but finds after the fact either that he misread the other's preferences or that the latter never intended to invoke sanctions for behavior contrary to his preferences.

²² “An Analysis of Social Power,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 15 (12 1950) p. 733Google Scholar.

²³ A major defect of Lord Russell's conception of power (see above, note 6) is that it utterly ignores this distinction. One can produce an “intended effect” through the exercise of either power or force.

²⁴ It is often true, when force is operative, that A gives B the option to comply with his demands between blows. But in such circumstances, should B bend to A's wishes, he does so out of fear of further sanctions, in which case force is transformed into power.

²⁵ One of the more penetrating critiques along these lines may be found in GeneralTaylor, Maxwell D., The Uncertain Trumpet (New York, 1959)Google Scholar.

²⁶ According to Bierstedt, op. cit., p. 731, “… influence is persuasive while power is coercive. We submit voluntarily to influence while power requires submission.” In our view, if B submits voluntarily, power is operative; but if he submits under duress, force is operative.

It is worth noting that under our definition it would be incorrect to say that Marx “influenced” Lenin, or that Haydn “influenced” Mozart, or that Jesus Christ “influenced” the Conquistadores. In each of these cases the second shared the values of the first, i.e., the relationship involved neither power nor influence, but authority. See part IV below.

²⁷ See Rovere, Richard H., Senator Joe McCarthy (New York, 1959)Google Scholar.

²⁸ Friedrich, C. J., “Authority, Reason and Discretion,” in Friedrich, C. J. (ed.), Authority (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), p. 37Google Scholar.

²⁹ Lasswell and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 133.

³⁰ Bierstedt, op. cit., p. 733.

³¹ Authority, pp. 36, 35.

³² As is perhaps obvious, if B chooses to defy A, the relationship no longer will involve power. This notion of rationality of choice is analogous to Thomas Hobbes's treatment of the relationship between fear and liberty. “Feare, and Liberty,” he wrote, “are consistent; as when a man throweth his goods into the Sea for feare the ship should sink, he doth it neverthelesse very willingly, and may refuse to doe it if he will: It is therefore the action, of one that was free.” Leviathan, Everyman Edition, p. 110.

³³ Friedrich, , Authority, p. 36Google Scholar. Reasoning also underlies the difference between authority and influence. Thus, if B complies with A's demand neither because he fears deprivations nor because his compliance is based upon reasoning, B has been influenced. This distinction will be further elaborated below.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 38.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 47.

³⁵ Dahl, Robert A., “The Analysis of Influence in Local Communities,” in Adrian, Charles (ed.), Social Science and Community Action (East Lansing, Mich., 1960), p. 26Google Scholar.

³⁷ Rossi, Peter, “Community Decision-Making,” in Young, Roland (ed.) Approaches to the Study of Politics (Evanston, Ill., 1958), p. 364Google Scholar.

³⁸ Op. cit., p. 74.

³⁹ For example, A may employ both authority and power to gain B's agreement, and B's response may have a similarly dual basis. An apparent case in point is the relationship between Adolf Hitler and some of his military chiefs during World War II. On this, consult Shirer, William L., The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New York, 1960), pp. 366 ffGoogle Scholar. and passim.

⁴⁰ The approach we have in mind is exemplified by the untutored, but nonetheless penetrating, study of “Springdale” by Joseph Vidich and Bensman, Arthur, Small Town in Mass Society (Princeton, N.J., 1958)Google Scholar. For further discussion of this point, see following section.

⁴¹ Ibid.