Abstract
In this paper a novel method for making serial number based authentication protocols resilient against database failure is described. The method is applicable to the situation where a single server wishes to authenticate itself to a number of clients, but cannot reliably maintain a sequence number database. The solution has recently been included in a draft international standard for third generation mobile telecommunications, [1].
- 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). 3G TS 33.102 version 3.0.0 --- Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Security Architecture, May 1999.Google Scholar
- International Organization for Standardization, Genève, Switzerland. ISO/IEC 9798-1: 1997, Information Technology --- Security techniques --- Entity authentication --- Part 1: General, Second edition, August 1997.Google Scholar
- L. Lamport. Time, clocks, and the ordering of events in a distributed system. Communications of the ACM,21:558-565, 1978. Google ScholarDigital Library
- K. Vedder. Security aspects of mobile communications. In R. Govaerts B. Preneel and J. Vandewalle, editors, Computer security and Industrial Cryptography: State of the Art and Evolution, number 741 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 193-210. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1993. Google ScholarDigital Library
Index Terms
- Making serial number based authentication robust against loss of state
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