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Counterfactual scorekeeping

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Abstract

Orthodoxy has it that counterfactuals cannot be treated as strict conditionals. But there is a loophole: if the strictness is a function of context then maybe they can be so treated. I argue for a loophole analysis that treats ‘would’-counterfactuals as strict conditionals that are duals to ‘might’- counterfactuals. Most of the work lies in getting straight about the interaction between context and semantic value. I treat it as a general feature of the dynamics of conversational score.

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Correspondence to Anthony S. Gillies.

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Thanks are due to Kai von Fintel, Nicholas Asher, Andy Egan, Josh Dever, Rich Thomason, Brian Weatherson, and two anonymous L&P referees. Early (in some cases very early) versions of some of the story here were presented at, and benefited from discussion with audiences at, the 14th Amsterdam Colloquium (December 2003), the Society for Exact Philosophy (Maryland; May 2004), the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology (Lund; August 2005), the University of Michigan (February 2006), Cornell University (May 2006), and the Oslo Dynamic Semantics Workshop (October 2006). This research was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. BCS-0547814.

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Gillies, A.S. Counterfactual scorekeeping. Linguist and Philos 30, 329–360 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-007-9018-6

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