Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

The inscrutability of colour similarity

  • Published:
Philosophical Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This paper presents a new response to the colour similarity argument, an argument that many people take to pose the greatest threat to colour physicalism. The colour similarity argument assumes that if colour physicalism is true, then colour similarities should be scrutable under standard physical descriptions of surface reflectance properties such as their spectral reflectance curves. Given this assumption, our evident failure to find such similarities at the reducing level seemingly proves fatal to colour physicalism. I argue that we should dispense with this assumption, and thus endorse the inscrutability of colour similarity. This strategy is inspired by parallels between the colour similarity argument and the explanatory gap between mind and body made vivid by Jackson’s (1986) knowledge argument, and in particular by type-B physicalist responses to that argument. This inscrutability response is further motivated by cases in chemistry and biochemistry in which analogous scrutability theses fail to hold. Along the way, I present a challenge to standard formulations of the colour similarity argument based on the extreme context sensitivity of the similarity relation. Most presentations of the argument fail to control for such contextual variation, which raises the distinct possibility that the argument equivocates on the similarity relation across its premises. Although ultimately inconclusive, this context challenge forces a significant reformulation of the colour similarity argument, and highlights the need for much greater care in handling claims about colour similarity.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Hilbert (1987), Byrne and Hilbert (2003). As standard in debates about colour ontology, I shall limit discussion to the hues and ignore aspects of colour such as saturation and lightness; see Byrne and Hilbert (2003, p. 14).

  2. Byrne and Hilbert (2003, pp. 10–11). Colour physicalists such as Hilbert (1987), Armstrong (1978), and Smart (1975) consider super determinate reflectances to be colours proper. This view entails that determinable categories such as red are strictly speaking not colours but rather classes of colours. For discussion of colour categorisation and its relationship to colour vision, see my ‘Colour Vision and Seeing Colours’ (ms.).

  3. See Byrne and Hilbert (1997, pp. xx–xxii) for a brief overview of dispositionalist theories of colour. Cohen (2009, Chap. 8.1) discusses the contrast between dispositionalist and functionalist theories of colour. Briefly, realiser forms of colour functionalism use subject-involving descriptions or functional roles to fix the reference of colour terms on their physical realisers, with which the colours are deemed strictly identical (Jackson 1998; McLaughlin 2000). If these realisers turn out to be surface reflectances, and if the relevant identities are type rather than token identities, then realiser functionalism will end up looking very much like the colour physicalist’s type-identity theory of colour. See Cohen (2009, pp. 187–188), and compare Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (1996) on realiser functionalism as a route to the identity theory of mind. In contrast, role functionalism takes colours to be identical with subject-involving functional roles (Cohen 2009, Chap. 7). Given the role played by subject responses in individuating colour properties, role functionalism is not in my view a form of colour physicalism. See Cohen (2003, §2) for contrasting discussion.

  4. The locus classicus for opponent colour theory is Hering (1920/1964). See also Hardin (1988, pp. 26, 30, 37–39, 52). The opponent hue pairings are red and green, and yellow and blue. It is important to recognise that the terms ‘composite’ and ‘component’ do not imply that binary hues are physically constituted by mixtures of different hues. See Byrne and Hilbert (2008) for relevant discussion.

  5. On the seriousness of the threat, see McLaughlin (2003, p. 111), Byrne and Hilbert (2003, p. 7), and Pautz (2006, p. 536). The colour structure argument is presented and endorsed by Maund (1995, pp. 42, 141), Thompson (1995, pp. 128–130, 135–139), Clark (1996, pp. 145–146), and Pautz (2006). Boghossian and Velleman (1991) and Johnston (1992) offer epistemological versions of the argument.

  6. One plausible explanation is that the different terms shift the comparison class for the predicate from mice to elephants: whereas that mouse is big {for a mouse}, that elephant is not big {for an elephant}. See Kennedy (2007).

  7. Goodman (1970, p. 444) likewise argues that similarity, like motion, requires a frame of reference. Empirical studies confirm the extreme variability of ordinary judgements of similarity. Medin et al. (1993, p. 271) report experiments which ‘show similarity to be dynamic and context dependent’. Murphy and Medin (1985, p. 296) say that ‘the relative weighting of a feature… varies with the stimulus context and task, so that there is no unique answer to the question of how similar is one object to another’. See also Barsalou (1982) and Tversky (1977).

  8. Here I am indebted to Adam Pautz, who brought to my attention the comparison with counterpart theory.

  9. This formulation of the argument is essentially the same as that presented by Pautz (2006, p. 540).

  10. Shoemaker (1991), Lewis (1997, pp. 339–340), McLaughlin (2003), Cohen (2003, 2009).

  11. Shoemaker (2003, p. 256).

  12. Lewis (1997, p. 330) seems happy to bite this bullet, remarking that ‘we might have had an offhand opinion that these relations originated as relations among surface properties. If so, we were wrong.’

  13. There might initially seem to be some tension between this response and the context challenge explored above. Whereas the context challenge granted the truth of both Colour Similarity and Reflectance Dissimilarity, the response now under consideration involves denying Reflectance Dissimilarity*. There is in fact no formal tension here, however, because the whole point of the context challenge was that Reflectance Dissimilarity and Colour Similarity involved different similarity relations, and that Reflectance Dissimilarity thus did not have the truth conditions specified in Reflectance Dissimilarity*.

  14. Strictly speaking, Byrne (2003) is discussing an epistemological version of the argument, but his point also applies here given that the stated motivation for Reflectance Dissimilarity* clearly depends on the assumption that colour similarities ought to be evident at the level of physical descriptions of reflectance properties.

  15. For recent discussion of a wide range of scrutability theses and their relationship to physicalism, see Chalmers (2012). Unfortunately, limitations of space dictate that I cannot engage with Chalmers’ work on this topic here.

  16. Lewis (1988).

  17. For an example of such a view, see Loar (1997). See Chalmers (2002) for a detailed taxonomy of the different varieties of physicalism.

  18. Thanks to Alex Byrne for confirming the accuracy of this interpretation in personal correspondence.

  19. See Block (2007) for relevant discussion and White (2007) for objections.

  20. The following discussion has been inspired and informed by Williamson’s (1990) discussion of the presentation sensitivity of discrimination, the acquisition of knowledge of distinctness. ‘Presentation’ is to be understood here in a broad and inclusive way. A single property type (scarlet) can be presented by terms (‘scarlet’), linguistic descriptions (‘the colour of my armchair’), and visual perceptual states (my state of visually perceiving the colour of my armchair), but can also be presented simply by its instances at particular places and times (my armchair).

  21. One only need peruse the vast literature on quantum similarity measures (for example, Carbó-Dorca and Mezey 1996), to appreciate the variety and complexity of representations developed to reflect aspects of chemical structural similarity.

  22. Important aspects of chemical structure are molecular constitution, configuration, and conformation. Constitution relates to the manner and sequence of bonding between atoms in a molecule. Configuration concerns the 3D arrangement of atoms in the molecule, particularly the valence angles of atoms as discussed above in connection with stereoisomers. Conformation relates to the thermodynamically stable spatial arrangements of atoms within a molecule.

  23. For example, Kubinyi (1998, p. 228; 2002, p. 244) reports that ‘the [biochemical] selectivity of these analogues against the two [adrenergic] receptors differs by nearly eight orders of magnitude, despite their close chemical similarity!’

  24. See also Patterson et al. (1996, p. 3049) on so-called ‘pharmacophoric descriptors’. The complex aggregations of chemical features represented by such descriptors are selected specifically on the basis of their ability to predict biological activity.

  25. One could perhaps view Byrne and Hilbert’s (2003, p. 15) hue magnitudes response to the colour similarity argument along these lines. Very roughly, this response sketches a way of representing reflectance-types that reflects the opponent coding employed by the colour vision system. I hope to discuss this approach in more detail in forthcoming work.

References

  • Armstrong, D. (1978). Universals and scientific realism: A theory of universals (Vol. II). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bajorath, J. (2002). Integration of virtual and high-throughput screening. Nature Reviews Drug Discovery, 1, 882–894.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barsalou, L. W. (1982). Context-independent and context-dependent information in concepts. Memory and Cognition, 10(1), 82–93.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Block, N. (2007). Max Black’s objection to mind–body identity. In T. Alter & S. Walter (Eds.), Phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge: New essays on consciousness and physicalism (pp. 249–306). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Boghossian, P. A., & Velleman, D. J. (1991). Physicalist theories of colour. In A. Byrne & D. Hilbert (Eds.). (1997). Readings on colour. Vol. 1: The philosophy of colour (pp. 105–136). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • Braddon-Mitchell, D., & Jackson, F. (1996). The philosophy of mind and cognition. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Byrne, A. (2003). Colour and similarity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66(3), 641–665.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Byrne, A., & Hilbert, D. (Eds.). (1997). Readings on colour. Vol. 1: The philosophy of colour. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • Byrne, A., & Hilbert, D. (2003). Colour realism and colour science. Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 26, 3–64.

    Google Scholar 

  • Byrne, A., & Hilbert, D. (2008). Basic sensible qualities and the structure of appearance. Philosophical Issues, 18, 385–405.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carbó-Dorca, R., & Mezey, P. G. (1996). Advances in molecular similarity (Vol. 1). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chalmers, D. (2002). Consciousness and its place in nature. In D. Chalmers (Ed.), Philosophy of mind: Classical and contemporary readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chalmers, D. (2012). Constructing the world. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Clark, A. (1996). True theories, false colours. Philosophy of Science, 63(Supplement Issue), S143–S150.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cohen, J. (2003). On the structural properties of the colours. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81, 78–95.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cohen, J. (2009). The red and the real: An essay on colour ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Goodman, N. (1970). Seven strictures on similarity. In L. Foster & J. Swanson (Eds.), Experience and theory. Boston: University of Massachusetts Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hardin, C. L. (1988). Colour for philosophers: Unweaving the rainbow. Indianapolis, MA: Hackett.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hering, E. (1920/1964). Grundzüge der Lehre vom Lichtsinn. Translated as Outlines of a theory of the light sense (L. M. Hurvich & D. Jameson, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

  • Hilbert, D. R. (1987). Colour and colour perception: A study in anthropocentric realism. Stanford: Center for the Study of Language and Information.

  • Jackson, F. C. (1986). What Mary didn’t know. Journal of Philosophy, 83, 291–295.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jackson, F. C. (1998). From metaphysics to ethics: A defence of conceptual analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Johnston, M. (1992). How to speak of the colours. Philosophical Studies, 68, 221–264.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Johnston, M. (1996). A mind–body problem at the surface of objects. Philosophical Issues, 7, 219–229.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kalderon, M. (2007). Colour pluralism. Philosophical Review, 116(4), 563–602.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kennedy, C. (2007). Vagueness and grammar: The semantics of relative and absolute gradable adjectives. Linguistics and Philosophy, 30, 1–45.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kubinyi, H. (1998). Similarity and dissimilarity: A medicinal chemist’s view. Perspectives in Drug Discovery and Design, 9–11, 225–252.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kubinyi, H. (2002). Chemical similarity and biological activities. Journal of Brazilian Chemical Society, 13(6), 717–726.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1986). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1988). What experience teaches. Proceedings of the Russellian Society, 13, 29–57.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1997). Naming the colours. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75, 325–342.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Loar, B. (1997). Phenomenal states. In N. Block, O. Flanagan, & G. Güzeldere (Eds.), The nature of consciousness: Philosophical debates. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maund, B. (1995). Colours: Their nature and representation. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • McLaughlin, B. (2000). Colours and colour spaces. In R. Cubb-Stevens (Ed.), Proceedings of the twentieth world congress of philosophy (Vol. 5). Philosophy Documentation Centre.

  • McLaughlin, B. (2003). Colour, consciousness, and colour consciousness. In Q. Smith & A. Jokic (Eds.), Consciousness: New philosophical perspectives (pp. 97–154). New York: Oxford University Press.

  • Medin, D. L., Goldstone, R. L., & Gentner, D. (1993). Respects for similarity. Psychological Review, 100(2), 254–278.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Murphy, G. L., & Medin, D. L. (1985). The role of theories in conceptual coherence. Psychological Review, 92(3), 289–316.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nikolova, N., & Jaworska, J. (2003). Approaches to measure chemical similarity—A review. QSAR & Combinatorial Science, 22(9–10), 1006–1026.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Patterson, D. E., Cramer, R. D., Ferguson, A. M., Clark, R. D., & Weinberger, L. E. (1996). Neighbourhood behaviour: A useful concept for validation of “molecular diversity” descriptors. Journal of Medicinal Chemistry, 39, 3049–3059.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pautz, A. (2006). Can the physicalist explain colour structure in terms of colour experience? Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 84(4), 535–564.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W. V. O. (1969/1999). Natural kinds. In J. Kim & E. Sosa (Eds.), Metaphysics: An anthology (pp. 223–242). Oxford: Blackwell, 1999.

  • Shoemaker, S. (1991). Qualia and consciousness. Mind, 100, 507–524.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shoemaker, S. (2003). Content, character, and colour. Philosophical Issues, 13(1), 253–278.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smart, J. J. C. (1975). On some criticisms of a physicalist theory of colours. In A. Byrne & D. Hilbert (Eds.). (1997). Readings on colour. Vol. 1: The philosophy of colour. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • Thompson, E. (1995). Colour vision: A study in cognitive science and the philosophy of perception. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tversky, A. (1977). Features of similarity. Psychological Review, 84(4), 327–352.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • White, S. L. (2007). Property dualism, phenomenal concepts, and the semantic premise. In T. Alter & S. Walter (Eds.), Phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge: New essays on consciousness and physicalism (pp. 210–248). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, T. (1990). Identity and discrimination. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

Thanks to John Hawthorne, Tim Williamson, and two audiences at the University of Cambridge for extremely helpful feedback on earlier versions of this paper. I am most grateful to the referee for Philosophical Studies, who has been identified to me as Adam Pautz, who provided an incredibly rich, detailed, and constructive set of comments that resulted in substantial changes and improvements to the paper.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Antwerp, Antwerpen, Belgium

    Will Davies

Authors
  1. Will Davies
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Davies, W. The inscrutability of colour similarity. Philos Stud 171, 289–311 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0272-x

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0272-x

Keywords

Search

Navigation