Abstract
Once the invention of the state is made, the question of controlling it arises.2 Taking recourse to controllers the ancient problem of controlling those who are in control emerges: ‘Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?’ (who will guard the guardians?). As far as this is concerned democratic self-rule has been and is often still regarded as a way out: self-control seems to eliminate the need for control and thereby the need for controllers. But taking a closer look most of us will agree with John Stuart Mill (On Liberty, chap. 1):
The ‘people’ who exercise the power are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised; and the ‘self-government’ spoken of is not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest. The will of the people, moreover, practically means the will of the most numerous or the most active part of the people; the majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority; the people, consequently, may desire to oppress a part of their number; and precautions are as much needed against this as against any other abuse of power. The limitation, therefore, of the power of government over individuals loses none of its importance when the holders of power are regularly accountable to the community, that is, to the strongest party therein. This view of things, recommending itself equally to the intelligence of thinkers and to the inclination of those important classes in European society to whose real or supposed interests democracy is adverse, has had no difficulty in establishing itself; and in political speculations ‘the tyranny of the majority’ is now generally included among the evils against which society requires to be on its guard.
For an overview see Gordon (1999).
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Güth, W., Kliemt, H., Napel, S. (2008). Democratic Defences and (De-)Stabilisations. In: Braham, M., Steffen, F. (eds) Power, Freedom, and Voting. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73382-9_11
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