Abstract
The Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction used typically to model sponsored search auctions does not include the notion of budget constraints, which is present in practice. Motivated by this, we introduce the different variants of GSP auctions that take budgets into account in natural ways. We examine their stability by focusing on the existence of Nash equilibria and envy-free assignments. We highlight the differences between these mechanisms and find that only some of them exhibit both notions of stability. This shows the importance of carefully picking the right mechanism to ensure stable outcomes in the presence of budgets.
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Díaz, J., Giotis, I., Kirousis, L., Markakis, E., Serna, M. (2014). On the Stability of Generalized Second Price Auctions with Budgets. In: Pardo, A., Viola, A. (eds) LATIN 2014: Theoretical Informatics. LATIN 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8392. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54423-1_60
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54423-1_60
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