Abstract
An agent normative society has to deal with two main concerns: how to define norms and how to enforce them. Enforcement becomes a complex issue as agent societies become more decentralized and open. We propose a new distributed mechanism to enforce norms by ostracizing agents that do not abide by them. Our simulations have shown that, although complete ostracism is not always possible, the mechanism substantially reduces the number of norm violations.
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Perreau de Pinninck, A., Sierra, C., Schorlemmer, M. (2008). Distributed Norm Enforcement Via Ostracism. In: Sichman, J.S., Padget, J., Ossowski, S., Noriega, P. (eds) Coordination, Organizations, Institutions, and Norms in Agent Systems III. COIN 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 4870. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79003-7_22
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79003-7_22
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-79002-0
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