Abstract
As defined by Aumann in 1959, a strong equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We give tight bounds on the strong price of anarchy for load balancing on related machines. We also give tight bounds for k-strong equilibria, where the size of a deviating coalition is at most k.
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Fiat, A., Kaplan, H., Levy, M., Olonetsky, S. (2007). Strong Price of Anarchy for Machine Load Balancing. In: Arge, L., Cachin, C., Jurdziński, T., Tarlecki, A. (eds) Automata, Languages and Programming. ICALP 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4596. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73420-8_51
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73420-8_51
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