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International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory

ADT 2017: Algorithmic Decision Theory pp 214–227Cite as

Precise Complexity of the Core in Dichotomous and Additive Hedonic Games

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 10576))

Abstract

Hedonic games provide a general model of coalition formation, in which a set of agents is partitioned into coalitions, with each agent having preferences over which other players are in her coalition. We prove that with additively separable preferences, it is \(\varSigma _2^p\)-complete to decide whether a core- or strict-core-stable partition exists, extending a result of Woeginger (2013). Our result holds even if valuations are symmetric and non-zero only for a constant number of other agents. We also establish \(\varSigma _2^p\)-completeness of deciding non-emptiness of the strict core for hedonic games with dichotomous preferences. Such results establish that the core is much less tractable than solution concepts such as individual stability.

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Acknowledgements

I thank the anonymous reviewers for helpful feedback that improved the clarity of presentation, and Lena Schend for useful discussions. I am supported by EPSRC, by ERC under grant number 639945 (ACCORD), and by COST Action IC1205.

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  1. Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

    Dominik Peters

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  1. Dominik Peters
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Correspondence to Dominik Peters .

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  1. Heinrich Heine University, Düsseldorf, Germany

    Jörg Rothe

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Peters, D. (2017). Precise Complexity of the Core in Dichotomous and Additive Hedonic Games. In: Rothe, J. (eds) Algorithmic Decision Theory. ADT 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10576. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67504-6_15

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67504-6_15

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-67503-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-67504-6

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