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International Conference on Concurrency Theory

CONCUR 2000: CONCUR 2000 — Concurrency Theory pp 380–394Cite as

On the Reachability Problem in Cryptographic Protocols

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 1877))

Abstract

We study the verification of secrecy and authenticity properties for cryptographic protocols which rely on symmetric shared keys. The verification can be reduced to check whether a certain parallel program which models the protocol and the specification can reach an erroneous state while interacting with an adversary. Assuming finite principals, we present a decision procedure for the reachability problem which is based on a ‘symbolic’ reduction system.

A full version of this paper is available as INRIA Research Report 3915, March 2000. The first author is a member of Action INRIA ‘MIMOSA’ and he is partially supported by WG-CONFER and RNRT-Marvel.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Laboratoire d’Informatique de Marseille, Université de Provence, France

    Roberto M. Amadio & Denis Lugiez

Authors
  1. Roberto M. Amadio
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  2. Denis Lugiez
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Pennsylvania State University, 220 Pond Laboratory, University Park, PA, 16802-6106, USA

    Catuscia Palamidessi

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© 2000 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Amadio, R.M., Lugiez, D. (2000). On the Reachability Problem in Cryptographic Protocols. In: Palamidessi, C. (eds) CONCUR 2000 — Concurrency Theory. CONCUR 2000. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1877. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44618-4_28

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44618-4_28

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-67897-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-44618-7

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