Abstract
HMAC is one of the most famous keyed hash functions, and widely utilized. In order to design secure hash functions, we often use PGV construction consisting of 64 schemes, each of which utilizes a block cipher. If the underlying block cipher is ideal, 12 schemes are proven to be secure. In this paper, we evaluate the security of these schemes in view of side channel attacks. As it turns out, HMACs based on 11 out of 12 secure PGV schemes are vulnerable to side channel attacks, even if the underlying block cipher is secure against side channel attacks. These schemes are classified into two groups based on their vulnerabilities. For the first group which contains 8 schemes, we show that the attacker can reveal the whole key of HMAC, and selectively forge in consequence. For the other group which contains 3 schemes, we specify the importance of the execution sequence for the inner operations of the scheme, and refine it. If wrong orders of operations are used, the attacker can reveal a portion of the key of HMAC. Hence, the use of HMACs based on such PGV schemes as they are is not recommended when the resistance against side channel attacks is necessary.
This work was partly supported by National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT).
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Bellare, M., Canetti, R., Krawczyk, H.: Keying Hash Functions for Message Authentication. In: Koblitz, N. (ed.) CRYPTO 1996. LNCS, vol. 1109, pp. 1–15. Springer, Heidelberg (1996)
Black, J., Rogaway, P., Shrimpton, T.: Black-box analysis of the block cipher-based hash-function constructions from PGV. In: Yung, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 2002. LNCS, vol. 2442, pp. 320–335. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Damgård, I.: A design priciple for hash functions. In: Brassard, G. (ed.) CRYPTO 1989. LNCS, vol. 435, pp. 416–427. Springer, Heidelberg (1990)
Dobbertin, H., Bosselaers, A., Preneel, B.: RIPEMD-160: A Strengthened Version of RIPEMD. In: Gollmann, D. (ed.) FSE 1996. LNCS, vol. 1039, pp. 71–82. Springer, Heidelberg (1996)
Kocher, C.: Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems. In: Koblitz, N. (ed.) CRYPTO 1996. LNCS, vol. 1109, pp. 104–113. Springer, Heidelberg (1996)
Kocher, C., Jaffe, J., Jun, B.: Differential Power Analysis. In: Wiener, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1999. LNCS, vol. 1666, pp. 388–397. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)
Lemke, K., Schramm, K., Paar, C.: DPA on n-Bit Sized Boolean and Arithmetic Operations and Its Application to IDEA, RC6, and the HMACConstruction. In: Joye, M., Quisquater, J.-J. (eds.) CHES 2004. LNCS, vol. 3156, pp. 205–219. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
RFC 1321, The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm (1992)
Messerges, T.S., Dabbish, E.A., Sloan, R.H.: Investigations of Power Analysis Attacks on Smartcards. In: USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology (1999)
Merkle, R.: One way hash functions and DES. In: Brassard, G. (ed.) CRYPTO 1989. LNCS, vol. 435, pp. 428–446. Springer, Heidelberg (1990)
Messerges, T.S.: Securing the AES Finalists Against Power Analysis Attacks. In: Schneier, B. (ed.) FSE 2000. LNCS, vol. 1978, pp. 150–164. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Messerges, T.S.: Using Second-Order Power Analysis to Attack DPA Resistant Software. In: Paar, C., Koç, Ç.K. (eds.) CHES 2000. LNCS, vol. 1965, pp. 238–251. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Okeya, K., Iwata, T.: Side Channel Attacks against Message Authentication Codes. In: Molva, R., Tsudik, G., Westhoff, D. (eds.) ESAS 2005. LNCS, vol. 3813, pp. 205–217. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Preneel, B., Govaerts, R., Vandewalle, J.: Hash functions based on block ciphers: A synthetic approach. In: Stinson, D.R. (ed.) CRYPTO 1993. LNCS, vol. 773, pp. 368–378. Springer, Heidelberg (1994)
FIPS PUB 180-2, Secure Hash Standard (SHS) (2002)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Okeya, K. (2006). Side Channel Attacks Against HMACs Based on Block-Cipher Based Hash Functions. In: Batten, L.M., Safavi-Naini, R. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4058. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11780656_36
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11780656_36
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-35458-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-35459-8
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)