Volume 113, Issue 11, November 2016
Carolina Sartorio
Pages 533-549
PAP-Style Cases
Over the years, two models of freedom have emerged as competitors: the alternative-possibilities model, which states that acting freely consists (at least partly) in being able to do otherwise, and, more recently, the actual-sequence model, which states that acting freely is exclusively a function of the actual sequence of events issuing in our behavior. In general, a natural strategy when trying to decide between two models of a certain concept is to look for examples that support one model and undermine the other. Frankfurt-style cases have been used for this kind of purpose, to challenge the alternative-possibilities view and support the actual-sequence view. In this paper I examine the prospects of the counterparts of Frankfurt-style cases: “PAP-style” cases, or cases that could be used to support the alternative-possibilities view and challenge the actual-sequence view. I argue that there are no successful PAP-style cases.