ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that the creation of the Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA) was a signature accomplishment, but recognizes the significant gap between original reform proposals and what was ultimately achieved. It examines the United Nation's (UN's) thinking on peacebuilding in the period immediately before the creation of the PBA, and provides an analysis of the negotiation process that led to the creation of the architecture as it is today. The chapter highlights key cleavages in the debate, particularly around a potential preventive mandate for the proposed commission, which put into clear relief the stakes for key member states, including the G-77 and the United States, as well as UN Secretariat and wider UN system actors. The Brahimi Report proposed building upon the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS), convened by the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA), to create an early warning mechanism: the ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Section (EISAS).
