Lingling Zhang, Xiuyu Zheng, Jun Li, Guangli Nie, Guoqing Huo, Yong Shi
Graduate University of Chinese Academy of Sciences.
Research Centre on Fictitious Economy and Data Science.
University of Nebraska at Omaha.
DOI: 10.4236/jssm.2008.13024   PDF    HTML     7,188 Downloads   12,806 Views   Citations

Abstract

Knowledge is the most important resource in an organization, and the knowledge transfer and sharing between employees is of vital importance for organizations. “Prisoner’s dilemma” exists in the process of the organizational knowledge transfer and sharing when the employees transfer their knowledge to the organization and share their knowledge with other employees. This paper analyzes the process and obstacle of the knowledge transfer and sharing in the organization and studies the game model of the knowledge transfer and sharing, and put forward the conclusion that different knowledge potential employees should be stimulated by different measures. Through analyzing principle-agent in the incentive mechanism, introducing the equity incentive method will have infinitely repeated games to the knowledge high-potential employees who are the key sources of the knowledge transfer and sharing in the incentive mechanism design. This makes it possible to break the prisoner's dilemma of the knowledge transfer and sharing.

Keywords

knowledge potential, knowledge sharing, knowledge transfer, incentive mechanism, game theory

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Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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