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Semiotic Systems, Computers, and the Mind: How Cognition Could Be Computing

Semiotic Systems, Computers, and the Mind: How Cognition Could Be Computing

William J. Rapaport
Copyright: © 2012 |Volume: 2 |Issue: 1 |Pages: 40
ISSN: 2155-5028|EISSN: 2155-5036|EISBN13: 9781466614055|DOI: 10.4018/ijsss.2012010102
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MLA

Rapaport, William J. "Semiotic Systems, Computers, and the Mind: How Cognition Could Be Computing." IJSSS vol.2, no.1 2012: pp.32-71. http://doi.org/10.4018/ijsss.2012010102

APA

Rapaport, W. J. (2012). Semiotic Systems, Computers, and the Mind: How Cognition Could Be Computing. International Journal of Signs and Semiotic Systems (IJSSS), 2(1), 32-71. http://doi.org/10.4018/ijsss.2012010102

Chicago

Rapaport, William J. "Semiotic Systems, Computers, and the Mind: How Cognition Could Be Computing," International Journal of Signs and Semiotic Systems (IJSSS) 2, no.1: 32-71. http://doi.org/10.4018/ijsss.2012010102

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Abstract

In this reply to James H. Fetzer’s “Minds and Machines: Limits to Simulations of Thought and Action”, the author argues that computationalism should not be the view that (human) cognition is computation, but that it should be the view that cognition (simpliciter) is computable. It follows that computationalism can be true even if (human) cognition is not the result of computations in the brain. The author also argues that, if semiotic systems are systems that interpret signs, then both humans and computers are semiotic systems. Finally, the author suggests that minds can be considered as virtual machines implemented in certain semiotic systems, primarily the brain, but also AI computers. In doing so, the author takes issue with Fetzer’s arguments to the contrary.

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