Abstract
Tversky and Kahneman (1983) showed that when subjects are asked to rate the likelihood of several alternatives, including single and joint events, they often make a “conjunction fallacy.” That is, they rate the conjunction of two events as being more likely than one of the constituent events. This, they claim, is a fallacy, since the conjunction of two events can never be more probable than either of the component events. In addition, they found that prior training in probability theory does not decrease the likelihood of making this fallacy. We argue that in some contexts, an alternative that contains the conjunction oftwo events can be more probable than an alternative that contains only one of the conjunction's constituent events. We carried out four experiments in which we manipulated this context. The frequency of making a conjunction fallacy was affected by the manipulation of context. Furthermore, when the context was clearly specified, prior training in statistics influenced the ratings.
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—Accepted by previous editor, Alice F. Healy
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Wolford, G., Taylor, H.A. & Beck, J.R. The conjunction fallacy?. Mem Cogn 18, 47–53 (1990). https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03202645
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03202645