Environmental Penalties, Investor Attention and Stock Market Reaction: Moderating Roles of Air Pollution and Industry Saliency
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Theoretical Foundations and Hypothesis Development
2.1. Environmental Penalty and Stock Market Reaction
2.2. Environmental Penalty and Investor Attention
2.3. Mediating Effect of Investor Attention
2.4. Moderating Role of Air Pollution
2.5. Moderating Role of Industry Saliency
3. Methods
3.1. Sample and Methodology
3.2. Variables
4. Results
4.1. Stock Market Reaction to Environmental Penalty
4.2. Hypothesis Testing
5. Discussions
5.1. Analysis of CAR
5.2. Conclusions
5.3. Theory Contributions
5.4. Practical Implications
5.5. Limitations and Further Direction
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Study | Research Setting | Applied Theory | Event | Modera-tor | Media-tor | Dependent Variable | Hypothesized Relationship | Main Findings |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Garner& Lacina (2019) | USA oil and gas firms (2010) | Signal theory | British Petroleum oil spill; Deepwater explosion; President Obama’s drilling ban | - | - | Stock market reaction | Environmental disclosure->CAR (-) | Environmental disclosure ->stock market reaction (-) |
Capelle-Blancard & Laguna (2010) | 64 explosions in chemical plants worldwide (1990–2005) | Event study | Injuries and fatalities; Toxic release | - | - | Abnormal returns; shareholder loss | Total number of fatalities and serious injuries; released toxic chemicals-> CAR; shareholder loss(-) | The fatality or serious injury is associated with an additional loss. The toxic release is associated with higher losses in longer event windows. |
Jacobs et al. (2010) | 417 CEI announcements and 363 EAC announcements | Signal theory | Corporate Environmental Initiatives; Environmental Awards and Certifications | Revenue gains; Cost reduction | - | Abnormal returns | CEIs and EACs->the market reaction (+); The market reaction to EACs is greater than that for CEIs | Announcements of philanthropic gifts for environmental causes are associated with significant positive market reaction, voluntary emission reductions are associated with significant negative market reaction, and ISO 14001 certifications are associated with significant positive market reaction. |
Xu et al. (2012) | 57 listed companies disclosed for environmental pollution in China (2010) | Event study | Pollution type; Disclosure source; Disclosure level; Modernization level; Major shareholder holding level; Company attribute | - | - | Abnormal returns | Pollution type; Disclosure source; level; Modernization level; Major shareholder holding level; Company attribute->CAR(-) | The negative environmental events of Chinese listed companies currently have weak impact on the stock market |
Dasgupta et al. (2012) | Korean public disclosure program | Event study | The media report contained in these monthly violation lists. | - | - | Abnormal returns | Environmental news->CAR(-) | The average reduction in market value is higher than them in other countries. The extent of media coverage is positive influence reduction in market value. |
Cordeiro &Tewari (2015) | 500 firms ranked by Newsweek US 2009 | Stakeholder theory | Firm’s position in the Newsweek Green Ranking | - | Firm size; firm legitimacy | Short-term and long-term stock market returns | Firm’s position in the Newsweek Green Ranking-> short-term and longer-term stock market reaction (+) firm’s industry-adjusted ranking based on its Green Score within the industry-> short-term and longer-term stock market reaction (+); firm size and organizational legitimacy as a moderator of investor reaction to environmental disclosure | Stock market investors react positively in terms of both the short and intermediate term; industry-adjusted rankings of environmental CSR and that the investor reaction is significantly influenced by firm size and firm legitimacy |
Flammer & Caroline (2013) | Announcement of corporate news related to environment for all USA publicly traded companies (1980- 2009) | Environment-as-a-resource | Environmental CSR | - | - | Stock market reaction; CARs | The announcement of eco-friendly corporate initiatives-> shareholders react (+); the announcement of eco- harmful corporate initiatives-> shareholders react (-); the announcement of eco-harmful corporate events over time-> shareholders’ negative reaction (+); the announcement of eco-friendly corporate events over time-> positive shareholders’ reaction (-) | The negative stock market reaction to eco-harmful behavior has increased, while the positive reaction to eco-friendly initiatives has decreased; The positive (negative) stock market reaction to eco-friendly (-harmful) events is smaller for companies with higher levels of environmental CSR the negative stock market reaction to eco-harmful behavior has increased, while the positive reaction to eco-friendly initiatives has decreased |
Grand& D’Elia (2012) | News appearing in Argentine newspapper La Nación (1995–2001) (2003–2008) | Signal theory | Positive environmental news; negative environmental news | - | - | AARs | ARit > 0 for positive announcements; ARit < 0 for negative events | The environmental news can cause impacts on stock returns in developing countries as high as those in developed ones. |
Lanoie et al. (1998) | Firms on British Columbia’s lists of polluters American and Canadian | SIMM (single-index market model) | Release of information | - | - | Average abnormal return AAR | Large polluters are affected more significantly by such release than smaller polluters | The capital markets react to the release of information in large polluters are affected more significantly from such release than smaller polluters |
Carpentier & Suret (2015) | 161major accidents reported on the front page of the New York Times from (1959 – 2010) | - | Accident announcement | - | - | Average compounded abnormal return | Major accident announcement -> market value in the mid-term (-); The negative mid-term effect of an accident announcement on the firm’s market value is lower for environmental than for non-environmental accidents; the negative mid-term effect following an accident announcement on the firm’s market value is stronger for airline accidents than for non-airline accidents; The negative mid-term effect following an accident announcement on market value is stronger for accidents followed by government intervention | The deterrence effect of the stock market in the mid-term for environmental problems is weak |
Konar & Cohen (1997) | Firms with TRI emissions USA 1988–1990 and 1991–1992 | Market-based incentive | Information on toxic chemical emissions | - | - | Abnormal returns | Market reacted more to unexpected TRI disclosures than to those that were already expected | Firms with the largest stock price decline on the day this information became public subsequently reduced emissions more than their industry peers |
Age | Total Assets | Sales | Net Profit | Employees | Penalty Amount | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Year | $million | $million | $million | s | $million | |
Mean | 19.506 | 981.830 | 590.385 | 5.496 | 3681 | 0.1324 |
Median | 19 | 495.163 | 212.078 | 1.910 | 2576 | 0.2 |
S.D. | 4.552 | 170.484 | 0.523 | 0.523 | 350.15 | 0.7261 |
Event Days () | N | Median | Za | Mean | t | % Negative | Zb |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
0 | 88 | −1.00% | −1.599 | 0.12% | −0.409 | 58.00% | −0.428 |
1 | 88 | −0.65% | −1.727 * | −0.49% | −2.006 * | 40.90% | −1.599 * |
2 | 88 | −0.60% | −1.831 * | −0.68% | −1.491 | 59.09% | −1.599 * |
3 | 88 | −0.94% | −2.064 ** | −0.94% | −1.872 * | 59.09% | −1.599 * |
4 | 88 | −0.88% | −2.288 ** | −1.14% | −2.229 ** | 59.09% | −1.599 * |
5 | 88 | −1.30% | −1.639 | −0.91% | −1.542 | 59.09% | −1.599 * |
6 | 88 | −0.65% | −1.153 | −0.53% | −0.8 | 56.82% | −1.173 |
7 | 88 | −0.97% | −1.277 | −0.48% | −0.604 | 56.82% | −1.173 |
8 | 88 | −1.30% | −1.419 | −0.64% | −0.713 | 57.95% | −1.386 |
9 | 88 | −1.51% | −1.897 | −1.35% | −1.309 | 53.41% | −0.533 |
10 | 88 | −1.16% | −1.964 * | −1.70% | −1.714 * | 55.68% | −0.959 |
(0,1) | 88 | −0.65% | −1.582 | −0.62% | −1.265 | 56.81% | −1.173 |
(0,5) | 88 | −3.12% | −2.064 ** | −4.03% | −1.769 ** | 60.47% | −2.025 * |
(6,10) | 88 | −6.98% | −1.739 | −4.69% | −1.133 | 55.68% | −0.959 |
(0,10) | 88 | −2.46% | −1.943 * | −8.73% | −1.465 | 59.09% | −1.599 |
Age | Market Value | Total Assets | Sales | Net Profit | Employees | Penalty Amount | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
year | $million | $million | $million | $million | s | $million | |
Mean | 18.581 | 1499.3 | 1532.744 | 648.140 | 35.004 | 3887.419 | 0.061 |
Median | 18 | 1061.147 | 774.5282 | 278.028 | 15.608 | 2943 | 0.030 |
S.D. | 5.02 | 1302.967 | 2170.029 | 1064.731 | 56.129 | 3504.478 | 0.074 |
Panel A. Heavy pollution industry | |||||||
Mean | 19.5 | 1123.231 | 823.962 | 388.933 | 14.362 | 3525.292 | 1.747 |
Median | 19.5 | 722.024 | 706.288 | 153.346 | 6.004 | 2335.5 | 0.041 |
S.D. | 3.833 | 1292.624 | 762.037 | 570.632 | 32.898 | 3245.003 | 7.917 |
Panel B. Non-heavy pollution industry |
Event Days () | Median | a | Mean | % Negative | b | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
0 | 59 | −0.10% | −0.523 | 0.47% | 1.267 | 54.23% | −0.657 |
1 | 59 | −0.80% | −1.774 * | −0.48% | −1.209 * | 62.71% | −1.823 * |
2 | 59 | −0.50% | −0.966 | −0.23% | −0.415 | 59.32% | −1.302 |
3 | 59 | −0.90% | −1.532 | −0.73% | −1.295 | 59.32% | −1.302 |
4 | 59 | −0.90% | −1.940 ** | −0.98% | −1.776 * | 59.32% | −1.302 |
5 | 59 | −0.78% | −1.004 | −0.82% | −1.28 | 55.93% | −0.781 |
6 | 59 | 0.49% | −0.589 | −0.47% | −0.757 | 55.93% | −0.781 |
7 | 59 | −0.84% | −0.981 | −0.78% | −1.154 | 57.62% | −1.042 |
8 | 59 | −1.24% | −1.585 | −1.19% | −1.664 | 59.32% | −1.302 |
9 | 59 | −1.51% | −1.897 * | −1.96% | −2.049 | 54.24% | −0.521 |
10 | 59 | −1.11% | −1.985 ** | −2.17% | −2.235 ** | 57.62% | −1.042 |
(0,1) | 59 | −1.04% | −0.823 | −0.01% | −0.007 | 59.32% | −1.302 |
(0,5) | 59 | −3.12% | −2.768 | −2.77% | −1.085 | 62.71% | 1.823 * |
(6,10) | 59 | −6.10% | −1.623 | −6.56% | −1.827 * | 54.24% | −0.521 |
(0,10) | 59 | −9.95% | −1.744 * | −9.33% | −1.681 * | 59.32% | −1.302 |
Panel A. Heavy pollution industry | |||||||
0 | 29 | −0.14% | −1.435 | −0.60% | −1.399 | 58.62% | 0.945 |
1 | 29 | −0.33% | −1.829 ** | −1.26% | −1.871 * | 58.33% | −0.743 |
2 | 29 | −0.92% | −1.762 * | −1.60% | −2.002 * | 58.33% | −0.743 |
3 | 29 | −1.43% | −1.416 | −1.36% | −1.349 | 58.33% | −0.743 |
4 | 29 | −0.84% | −1.33 | −1.46% | −1.428 | 58.33% | −0.743 |
5 | 29 | −2.52% | −1.178 | −1.08% | −0.875 | 65.52% | −1.486 |
6 | 29 | −2.09% | −0.941 | −0.65% | −0.411 | 58.33% | −0.743 |
7 | 29 | −2.44% | −0.66 | −0.14% | 0.071 | 55.17% | −0.371 |
8 | 29 | −2.29% | −0.335 | 0.48% | 0.206 | 55.17% | −0.371 |
9 | 29 | −1.73% | −0.66 | −0.10% | −0.042 | 51.72% | 0 |
10 | 29 | −1.66% | −0.638 | −0.75% | −0.327 | 51.72% | 0 |
(0,1) | 29 | −0.24% | −0.962 | −1.11% | −1.118 * | 51.72% | 0 |
(0,5) | 29 | −3.78% | −1.503 | −6.61% | −1.435 | 58.33% | −0.743 |
(6,10) | 29 | −8.37% | −0.681 | −0.88% | −0.086 | 58.33% | −0.743 |
(0,10) | 29 | −21.08% | −0.854 | −7.49% | −0.524 | 58.33% | −0.743 |
Panel B. Non-heavy pollution industry |
M | S.D. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Age | 19.489 | 4.528 | ||||||||||
Firm sizes | 9.818 | 15.992 | 0.124 | |||||||||
Sales | 5.904 | 11.472 | 0.051 | 0.552 ** | ||||||||
Net profit | 5.496 | 0.523 | 0.037 | −0.058 | −0.046 | |||||||
Punished numbers | 1.421 | 1.036 | 0.215 * | 0.141 | 0.078 | −0.043 | ||||||
Ownership type | 0.38 | 0.487 | 0.276 ** | 0.295 ** | 0.328 ** | −0.082 | 0.231 * | |||||
Environmental penalty | 0.046 | 0.267 | 0.17 | 0.15 | 0.249 * | −0.018 | 0.733 ** | 0.206 | ||||
Investor attention | 0.255 | 0.471 | −0.067 | −0.002 | 0.02 | −0.016 | −0.250 * | −0.044 | −0.279 ** | |||
Air pollution | 0.067 | 0.368 | −0.032 | −0.064 | −0.138 | 0.087 | −0.109 | −0.043 | −0.178 | 0.036 | ||
Industry saliency | 0.67 | 0.473 | 0.033 | 0.175 | 0.028 | −0.152 | −0.066 | −0.056 | −0.220 * | 0.157 | −0.024 | |
Abnormal return | −0.006 | 0.034 | 0.043 | −0.091 | 0.171 | −0.059 | 0.023 | 0.245 * | 0.01 | 0.206 | −0.269 * | 0.102 |
Variables | Abnormal Returns | Abnormal Returns | Investor Attention | Investor Attention | Investor Attention | Investor Attention | Investor Attention |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Model1 | Model2 | Model3 | Model4 | Model5 | Model6 | Model7 | |
Age | 0.006 | 0.008 | −0.012 | −0.012 | −0.013 | −0.02 | −0.018 |
Total assets | −0.318 * | −0.318 * | −0.002 | −0.002 | −0.001 | −0.025 | −0.006 |
Sales | 0.287 * | 0.269 * | 0.088 | 0.087 | 0.095 | 0.085 | 0.073 |
Net profit | −0.043 | −0.039 | −0.02 | −0.019 | −0.018 | −0.003 | −0.001 |
Punished numbers | 0.073 | 0.089 | −0.076 | −0.076 | −0.049 | −0.097 | −0.121 |
Ownership type | 0.248 ** | 0.248 ** | −0.003 | −0.003 | −0.011 | 0.011 | 0.032 |
Environmental penalty | −0.12 | −0.068 | −0.279 ** | −0.243 ** | −0.282 ** | −0.200 ** | −0.251 ** |
Investor attention | 0.214 * | ||||||
Air pollution | −0.002 | −0.014 | |||||
Industry saliency | 0.109 | 0.015 | |||||
Environmental penalty * Air pollution | 0.274 * | ||||||
Environmental penalty * Industry saliency | −0.184 ** | ||||||
0.142 | 0.181 | 0.09 | 0.079 | 0.075 | 0.1 | 0.095 | |
Adjusted | 0.067 | 0.101 | 0.01 | 0.046 | 0.064 | 0.009 | 0.062 |
F | 1.894 * | 2.226 ** | 7.280 ** | 3.608 ** | 6.976 ** | 1.098 * | 2.929 ** |
Panel A. Heavy pollution industry | |||||||
Median | a | Mean | % Negative | b | |||
Environmental penalty | 59 | 0.16% | −4.731 *** | 0.55% | 1.836 * | 8.48% | −6.093 *** |
Investor attention (0) | 59 | 1.50% | −3.550 *** | 15.62% | 3.670 *** | 20.34% | −3.846 *** |
Investor attention (1) | 59 | 1.82% | −3.550 *** | 30.70% | 1.557 | 20.34% | −3.846 *** |
Panel B. Non−heavy pollution industry | |||||||
Median | a | Mean | % Negative | b | |||
Environmental penalty | 29 | 1.18% | −2.960 ** | 12.95% | 1.526 | 17.24% | −3.213 *** |
Investor attention (0) | 29 | 6.68% | −1.784 * | 9.19% | 1.19 | 31.04% | −1.857 * |
Investor attention (1) | 29 | 11.61% | −2.206 ** | 15.05% | 1.714 ** | 27.59% | −2.228 ** |
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Wu, H.; Feng, T.; Jiang, W.; Kong, T. Environmental Penalties, Investor Attention and Stock Market Reaction: Moderating Roles of Air Pollution and Industry Saliency. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2022, 19, 2660. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph19052660
Wu H, Feng T, Jiang W, Kong T. Environmental Penalties, Investor Attention and Stock Market Reaction: Moderating Roles of Air Pollution and Industry Saliency. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2022; 19(5):2660. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph19052660
Chicago/Turabian StyleWu, Hua, Taiwen Feng, Wenbo Jiang, and Ting Kong. 2022. "Environmental Penalties, Investor Attention and Stock Market Reaction: Moderating Roles of Air Pollution and Industry Saliency" International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 19, no. 5: 2660. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph19052660